In this final episode of Programmed to Fail, we explore the true importance of reforming the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process in the Department of Defense. Some may say that it is only a poor craftsman who blames his tools, that it is deficiencies in the workforce rather than problems of the acquisition and budgeting systems that are holding weapons innovation back. But certainly, it is not the lack of quality and drive in the people that has held North Korea back relative to their neighbors in South Korea, or that has stymied the growth of nations in the former Soviet Union. It was the ideologies of the political economy thrust upon the people that so devastated their culture. The PPBE is a similarly radical break from American values and traditions that has left good people burdened by a bad process. No longer can the defense acquisition workforce take joy in their hefty responsibility. No longer can the workforce see themselves in their work. They are tossed about in a system too large for them to affect, and the workforce is expected to be like a caretaker driving a train down pre-set tracks, rather than an explorer, a creator, and a builder with intrinsic value. Fulfilling individual desires to contribute to national security will more rapidly accelerate our common security than any top-down optimization and 30-year lifecycle plan. The problem is how large groups of people can be coordinated to achieve an end that is beyond the comprehension of any small group or plan. That is what we will explore in this final chapter of Programmed to Fail.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at https://AcquisitionTalk.com

In this final episode of Programmed to Fail, we explore the true importance of reforming the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process in the Department of Defense. Some may say that it is only a poor craftsman who blames his tools, that it is deficiencies in the workforce rather than problems of the acquisition and budgeting systems that are holding weapons innovation back. But certainly, it is not the lack of quality and drive in the people that has held North Korea back relative to their neighbors in South Korea, or that has stymied the growth of nations in the former Soviet Union. It was the ideologies of the political economy thrust upon the people that so devastated their culture. The PPBE is a similarly radical break from American values and traditions that has left good people burdened by a bad process. No longer can the defense acquisition workforce take joy in their hefty responsibility. No longer can the workforce see themselves in their work. They are tossed about in a system too large for them to affect, and the workforce is expected to be like a caretaker driving a train down pre-set tracks, rather than an explorer, a creator, and a builder with intrinsic value. Fulfilling individual desires to contribute to national security will more rapidly accelerate our common security than any top-down optimization and 30-year lifecycle plan. The problem is how large groups of people can be coordinated to achieve an end that is beyond the comprehension of any small group or plan. That is what we will explore in this final chapter of Programmed to Fail. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="https://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://AcquisitionTalk.com</a>

Programmed to Fail - 10. Culture

In this episode of Programmed to Fail, we explore how accounting costs do not reveal the value being generated in the production process and cannot be used, on their own, as a guide for specific choices. Cost is not an objective reality, particularly to those who know the vagaries of cost accounting. Instead, our view of cost depends on subjective use value and is related to the term opportunity cost, or the next-best choice foregone. This chapter reveals that for defense acquisition to truly understand weapons value and leverage the power of commercial markets, it needs to shift away from its obsession with financial metrics.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at https://AcquisitionTalk.com

In this episode of Programmed to Fail, we explore how accounting costs do not reveal the value being generated in the production process and cannot be used, on their own, as a guide for specific choices. Cost is not an objective reality, particularly to those who know the vagaries of cost accounting. Instead, our view of cost depends on subjective use value and is related to the term opportunity cost, or the next-best choice foregone. This chapter reveals that for defense acquisition to truly understand weapons value and leverage the power of commercial markets, it needs to shift away from its obsession with financial metrics. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="https://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://AcquisitionTalk.com</a>

Programmed to Fail - 9. Cost

Dorothy Engelhardt

In this episode of the Acquisition Talk podcast,  Dorothy Engelhart joins me to discuss unmanned surface and underwater vessel development in the United States Navy. Dorothy is the Director of Unmanned Systems in the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for ships, and she has been in this role since 2015. Before that, she was a senior acquisition manager for Marine Corps MDAPs, and had over 20 years of experience in NAVAIR as well as experience on the Hill.1:04 - Rundown of the unmanned portfolio2:40 - Enabling technologies vs. Program of Record4:45 - Timeline to fielding USVs and UUVs7:00 - Owning the data for autonomy11:10 - Capability over time curves and USV requirements15:00 - USV Concept of operations19:30 - Industry's readiness for USV production27:40 - Agile funding and acquisition authorities35:00 - Speed of adoption in Turkey and other nations37:30 - "As a service" business model41:50 - Navy's autonomy roadmap45:00 - Total cost of ownership49:40 - The Disruptor newsletterThis podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at https://AcquisitionTalk.com

In this episode of the Acquisition Talk podcast, Dorothy Engelhart joins me to discuss unmanned surface and underwater vessel development in the United States Navy. Dorothy is the Director of Unmanned Systems in the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for ships, and she has been in this role since 2015. Before that, she was a senior acquisition manager for Marine Corps MDAPs, and had over 20 years of experience in NAVAIR as well as experience on the Hill. 1:04 - Rundown of the unmanned portfolio 2:40 - Enabling technologies vs. Program of Record 4:45 - Timeline to fielding USVs and UUVs 7:00 - Owning the data for autonomy 11:10 - Capability over time curves and USV requirements 15:00 - USV Concept of operations 19:30 - Industry's readiness for USV production 27:40 - Agile funding and acquisition authorities 35:00 - Speed of adoption in Turkey and other nations 37:30 - "As a service" business model 41:50 - Navy's autonomy roadmap 45:00 - Total cost of ownership 49:40 - The Disruptor newsletter This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="https://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://AcquisitionTalk.com</a>

The state of Navy unmanned with Dorothy Engelhardt

In this episode of Programmed to Fail, we discuss the integral role of rivalrous competition in the discovery of knowledge and the growth of technology. It finds that policy maker's dreams about single best plans and pre-coordinating service behavior to avoid duplication, competition, and overlap is a false economy, one that stamps out the true creative potential of the American people and harms national security.Competition not only regulates incentives by prospect of punishment and reward. Just as importantly, the competitive process solves critical problems of knowledge. In fact, competition is most important under the presence of uncertainty. Planners cannot know what is optimal outside the process in which alternative courses of action are developed, brought into competition, and evaluated. Friedrich Hayek described how “In sporting events, examinations, the awarding of government contracts, or the bestowal of prizes for poems, not to mention science, it would be patently absurd to sponsor a contest if we knew in advance who the winner would be.” The information on which sports team performs better, or which project plan provides the most value, is only discovered in the process of competition. Otherwise, the rivalry is wasteful if one could reliably pre-determine the winner. Dynamic competition results in the emergence of complex patterns of economic behavior, and consequently, technological growth. It is very different from the type of competition taught in economic textbooks or practiced in defense management. In economics, we are told about “perfect” competition, a concept which relies on bizarre assumptions of complete information and product homogeneity. In defense, we are told that contracts are awarded “competitively,” even when solutions are pre-specified and the contractors who buy-in get bailed-out. While officials in the Department of Defense have often talked about the benefits of competition, the policies they’ve pursued continually run counter to the one real condition necessary for competitive forces to occur: free entry. Contrary to traditional wisdom, the history of defense acquisition has shown that the advertisement and open bid process does not provide assurance of free entry. When government is the only buyer, free entry requires an organization designed for pluralism.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at https://AcquisitionTalk.com

In this episode of Programmed to Fail, we discuss the integral role of rivalrous competition in the discovery of knowledge and the growth of technology. It finds that policy maker's dreams about single best plans and pre-coordinating service behavior to avoid duplication, competition, and overlap is a false economy, one that stamps out the true creative potential of the American people and harms national security. Competition not only regulates incentives by prospect of punishment and reward. Just as importantly, the competitive process solves critical problems of knowledge. In fact, competition is most important under the presence of uncertainty. Planners cannot know what is optimal outside the process in which alternative courses of action are developed, brought into competition, and evaluated. Friedrich Hayek described how “In sporting events, examinations, the awarding of government contracts, or the bestowal of prizes for poems, not to mention science, it would be patently absurd to sponsor a contest if we knew in advance who the winner would be.” The information on which sports team performs better, or which project plan provides the most value, is only discovered in the process of competition. Otherwise, the rivalry is wasteful if one could reliably pre-determine the winner. Dynamic competition results in the emergence of complex patterns of economic behavior, and consequently, technological growth. It is very different from the type of competition taught in economic textbooks or practiced in defense management. In economics, we are told about “perfect” competition, a concept which relies on bizarre assumptions of complete information and product homogeneity. In defense, we are told that contracts are awarded “competitively,” even when solutions are pre-specified and the contractors who buy-in get bailed-out. While officials in the Department of Defense have often talked about the benefits of competition, the policies they’ve pursued continually run counter to the one real condition necessary for competitive forces to occur: free entry. Contrary to traditional wisdom, the history of defense acquisition has shown that the advertisement and open bid process does not provide assurance of free entry. When government is the only buyer, free entry requires an organization designed for pluralism. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="https://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://AcquisitionTalk.com</a>

Programmed to Fail - 8. Competition

Welcome to a special series on the acquisition talk podcast that gives you an audiobook tour of my research project titled, Programmed to Fail: The Rise of Central Planning in Defense Acquisition 1945 to 1975. I’m Eric Lofgren of the Baroni Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. You can find this book for free and over 1,300 blog posts on my website, https://AcquisitionTalk.com.In this chapter of Programmed to Fail, we dive into how complex order in the real world emerges from simple and iterative systems of nonlinear interactions. The umbrella term of complex adaptive systems is used to describe self-organizing systems of emergent order that adapt to an uncertain environment. While these properties are not in general desirable for weapon systems that humans use in the field, they are certainly desirable properties for the defense acquisition system as much as they are for market economies. In this chapter, we trace John Boyd’s work from weapon systems design into complexity theory that leverages Godel’s incompleteness theorem, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and the second law of thermodynamics. We find that the only realistic way to generate a system that exhibits complex behaviors beyond the foresight of any individual is to build from the bottom-up according to simple rules. Tacit coordination based on local conditions can then give rise to emergent order, a process not appreciated by advocates of top-down planning and built into the foundations of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System. While complexity theories have started to penetrate the philosophy of military operations, we are still at the early stages of appreciating these ideas in the world of defense acquisition.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at https://AcquisitionTalk.com

Welcome to a special series on the acquisition talk podcast that gives you an audiobook tour of my research project titled, Programmed to Fail: The Rise of Central Planning in Defense Acquisition 1945 to 1975. I’m Eric Lofgren of the Baroni Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. You can find this book for free and over 1,300 blog posts on my website, <a href="https://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://AcquisitionTalk.com</a>. In this chapter of Programmed to Fail, we dive into how complex order in the real world emerges from simple and iterative systems of nonlinear interactions. The umbrella term of complex adaptive systems is used to describe self-organizing systems of emergent order that adapt to an uncertain environment. While these properties are not in general desirable for weapon systems that humans use in the field, they are certainly desirable properties for the defense acquisition system as much as they are for market economies. In this chapter, we trace John Boyd’s work from weapon systems design into complexity theory that leverages Godel’s incompleteness theorem, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and the second law of thermodynamics. We find that the only realistic way to generate a system that exhibits complex behaviors beyond the foresight of any individual is to build from the bottom-up according to simple rules. Tacit coordination based on local conditions can then give rise to emergent order, a process not appreciated by advocates of top-down planning and built into the foundations of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System. While complexity theories have started to penetrate the philosophy of military operations, we are still at the early stages of appreciating these ideas in the world of defense acquisition. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="https://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://AcquisitionTalk.com</a>

Programmed to Fail - 7. Complexity

In this episode, we take a look at the history of the the defense innovation process and compare it to processes in Western Europe and the Soviet Union. It also discusses the origins of the 5000-series regulations for acquisition and the stage-gate theory of development. It includes a case study on the Lightweight Fighter program which provided DoD the F-16 and F-18 fighter aircraft, and traces how their success was an unlikely outcome that required the dogged intervention of John Boyd and the fighter mafia, demonstrating how difficult non-consensual innovation can be in the Department of Defense.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com

In this episode, we take a look at the history of the the defense innovation process and compare it to processes in Western Europe and the Soviet Union. It also discusses the origins of the 5000-series regulations for acquisition and the stage-gate theory of development. It includes a case study on the Lightweight Fighter program which provided DoD the F-16 and F-18 fighter aircraft, and traces how their success was an unlikely outcome that required the dogged intervention of John Boyd and the fighter mafia, demonstrating how difficult non-consensual innovation can be in the Department of Defense. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>

Programmed to Fail - 6. Innovation

Welcome to a special series on the acquisition talk podcast that gives you an audiobook tour of my research project titled, Programmed to Fail: The Rise of Central Planning in Defense Acquisition 1945 to 1975. I’m Eric Lofgren of the Baroni Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. You can find this book for free and over 1,300 blog posts on my website, AcquisitionTalk.com.Monolithic program budgets have led to monolithic contracts that have thwarted technical goals. However, if DoD can reform its budgeting process, it can also unpack system requirements and modularize contracts alongside technically separable components. This is important because different elements of a system have different development cycle times. For example, advances in material sciences and infrastructure move slowly, perhaps on the order of five to ten years or more. Aided by Moore’s law, electronics can cycle through new models every couple of years. Software is even faster, capable of deploying new updates potentially every day. Defense officials cannot afford to slow down entire weapon systems to the slowest common denominator, and must instead move in asynchronous times to maximize technological progress.In this episode of Programmed to Fail, the relationship between the budgeting and contracting processes will be made. It finds that the premature of defining entire program lifecycles also makes its way into the contract, which constrains the adaptive learning process. A properly functioning contract process with industry requires a flexible budgeting process within government.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com

Welcome to a special series on the acquisition talk podcast that gives you an audiobook tour of my research project titled, Programmed to Fail: The Rise of Central Planning in Defense Acquisition 1945 to 1975. I’m Eric Lofgren of the Baroni Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. You can find this book for free and over 1,300 blog posts on my website, <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>. Monolithic program budgets have led to monolithic contracts that have thwarted technical goals. However, if DoD can reform its budgeting process, it can also unpack system requirements and modularize contracts alongside technically separable components. This is important because different elements of a system have different development cycle times. For example, advances in material sciences and infrastructure move slowly, perhaps on the order of five to ten years or more. Aided by Moore’s law, electronics can cycle through new models every couple of years. Software is even faster, capable of deploying new updates potentially every day. Defense officials cannot afford to slow down entire weapon systems to the slowest common denominator, and must instead move in asynchronous times to maximize technological progress. In this episode of Programmed to Fail, the relationship between the budgeting and contracting processes will be made. It finds that the premature of defining entire program lifecycles also makes its way into the contract, which constrains the adaptive learning process. A properly functioning contract process with industry requires a flexible budgeting process within government. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>

Programmed to Fail - 5. Contracting

In this episode, we explore how the Department of Defense radically broke from liberal traditions and American values by installing a Soviet-style process called the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System, or PPBS. It is not a coincidence that progress in military technologies dramatically slowed down over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. This is a direct implication of the PPBS which took decisions out of the hands of people closest to the work and rose the status of unaccountable bureaucrats aligned with comptrollers, accountants, economists, and analysis.There has been a growing recognition of the need to reform the industrial age PPBE process so that the United States can outpace peer-competitors like China and Russia in military technology. Senator Jack Reed said of PPBE, “It is likely too slow and cumbersome to meet many of DoD’s requirements to adopt new technologies in a rapid, agile manner.” Representative Adam Smith said, “We’ve got to give the Pentagon greater flexibility in terms of moving money around so that they’re not locked into a two-year or five-year cycle.” Former Representative Mac Thornberry wrote how “Today’s rapid innovation and technological change renders our industrial age approach to funding obsolete”The fiscal year 2022 national defense authorization act created a congressional commission to investigate reform of the PPB system. The commission has a hefty duty for it is the first major review of the resourcing system since the Jackson Committee hearings of the late 1960s. They are tasked with analyzing the extensive timelines, new and agile budgeting methods, how other agencies and countries resource programs, and make recommendations.This episode of Programmed to Fail provides an important economic backdrop to the adoption of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System, a system that continues to dominate how money flows and weapons are resourced today, and why it must be reformed.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com

In this episode, we explore how the Department of Defense radically broke from liberal traditions and American values by installing a Soviet-style process called the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System, or PPBS. It is not a coincidence that progress in military technologies dramatically slowed down over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. This is a direct implication of the PPBS which took decisions out of the hands of people closest to the work and rose the status of unaccountable bureaucrats aligned with comptrollers, accountants, economists, and analysis. There has been a growing recognition of the need to reform the industrial age PPBE process so that the United States can outpace peer-competitors like China and Russia in military technology. Senator Jack Reed said of PPBE, “It is likely too slow and cumbersome to meet many of DoD’s requirements to adopt new technologies in a rapid, agile manner.” Representative Adam Smith said, “We’ve got to give the Pentagon greater flexibility in terms of moving money around so that they’re not locked into a two-year or five-year cycle.” Former Representative Mac Thornberry wrote how “Today’s rapid innovation and technological change renders our industrial age approach to funding obsolete” The fiscal year 2022 national defense authorization act created a congressional commission to investigate reform of the PPB system. The commission has a hefty duty for it is the first major review of the resourcing system since the Jackson Committee hearings of the late 1960s. They are tasked with analyzing the extensive timelines, new and agile budgeting methods, how other agencies and countries resource programs, and make recommendations. This episode of Programmed to Fail provides an important economic backdrop to the adoption of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System, a system that continues to dominate how money flows and weapons are resourced today, and why it must be reformed. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>

Programmed to Fail - 4. Planning-Programming-Budgeting

Welcome to a special series on the acquisition talk podcast that gives you an audiobook tour of my research project titled, Programmed to Fail: The Rise of Central Planning in Defense Acquisition 1945 to 1975. I’m Eric Lofgren of the Baroni Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. You can find this book for free and over 1,300 blog posts on my website, AcquisitionTalk.com.In this third episode, we look at the 1950s debates over how weapons development should proceed. The listener will find strong parallels to the modern debates over waterfall vs. agile development practices. Weapons development in the 1940s and 50s followed an agile method of iterative and incremental decisions made by small, empowered teams. Yet this practice became supplanted by the belief that iteration and competitive developments revealed a failure to plan, and that planning could relieve all uncertainties in weapons development.As you listen to the story, consider how weapons today are expected to proceed linearly from science, to prototyping, to full scale development, production, then operations and sustainment. There is little or no room for feedback mechanisms and learning.However, another important aspect of software today is not just agile development, but continuous development and deployment of capability in what is called devops. The lines between development and production are not as clear today as they were presented in the hardware-oriented world of the 1950s. Listen in on our third chapter of the Programmed to Fail story, this time focusing of the emerging religion of systems analysis, a religion which continues to pervade the defense acquisition system 70 years later.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com

Welcome to a special series on the acquisition talk podcast that gives you an audiobook tour of my research project titled, Programmed to Fail: The Rise of Central Planning in Defense Acquisition 1945 to 1975. I’m Eric Lofgren of the Baroni Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. You can find this book for free and over 1,300 blog posts on my website, <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>. In this third episode, we look at the 1950s debates over how weapons development should proceed. The listener will find strong parallels to the modern debates over waterfall vs. agile development practices. Weapons development in the 1940s and 50s followed an agile method of iterative and incremental decisions made by small, empowered teams. Yet this practice became supplanted by the belief that iteration and competitive developments revealed a failure to plan, and that planning could relieve all uncertainties in weapons development. As you listen to the story, consider how weapons today are expected to proceed linearly from science, to prototyping, to full scale development, production, then operations and sustainment. There is little or no room for feedback mechanisms and learning. However, another important aspect of software today is not just agile development, but continuous development and deployment of capability in what is called devops. The lines between development and production are not as clear today as they were presented in the hardware-oriented world of the 1950s. Listen in on our third chapter of the Programmed to Fail story, this time focusing of the emerging religion of systems analysis, a religion which continues to pervade the defense acquisition system 70 years later. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>

Programmed to Fail - 3. Systems Analysis

Welcome to a special series on the acquisition talk podcast that gives you an audiobook tour of my research project titled, Programmed to Fail: The Rise of Central Planning in Defense Acquisition 1945 to 1975. I’m Eric Lofgren of the Baroni Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. You can find this book for free and over 1,300 blog posts on my website, AcquisitionTalk.com.In this episode, we take a look at the history of the unification of the armed forces under a single Department of Defense. Even today, we hear calls for the elimination of duplication, competition, and overlap between the military services. Proponents believe that military affairs can be brought into a state of perfection. But could you imagine if the government decided that only IBM could build computers, only Ford could build cars, and only AT&amp;T could provide telecommunications? It’s pretty clear that innovation would have been stopped in its tracks. The following provides an overview of two chapters: first, how calls for centralization resulted in unification of the armed forces, and second, the seeds of program budgeting which was intended to be the administrative tool of centralized decision makers.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com

Welcome to a special series on the acquisition talk podcast that gives you an audiobook tour of my research project titled, Programmed to Fail: The Rise of Central Planning in Defense Acquisition 1945 to 1975. I’m Eric Lofgren of the Baroni Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. You can find this book for free and over 1,300 blog posts on my website, <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>. In this episode, we take a look at the history of the unification of the armed forces under a single Department of Defense. Even today, we hear calls for the elimination of duplication, competition, and overlap between the military services. Proponents believe that military affairs can be brought into a state of perfection. But could you imagine if the government decided that only IBM could build computers, only Ford could build cars, and only AT&amp;T could provide telecommunications? It’s pretty clear that innovation would have been stopped in its tracks. The following provides an overview of two chapters: first, how calls for centralization resulted in unification of the armed forces, and second, the seeds of program budgeting which was intended to be the administrative tool of centralized decision makers. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>

Programmed to Fail - 1. Unification & 2. Program Budgeting

A podcast on the management, technology, and political-economy of weapon systems acquisition.

Acquisition Talk is shedding light on some very important issues, and doing so in a way that is both authoritative and accessible.

Bravo zulu, Eric Lofgren!

An important contribution

Acquisition Talk

Matt Steckman

Matt Steckman joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss about a wide range of issues facing growth-stage companies in the defense industry. He is the Chief Revenue Officer of Anduril Industries. Topics include:- Edge computing and the future of artificial intelligence- How to think about risk taking in product development- The beauty of the Air Force's approach enterprise tools- How cost and pricing data becomes self-reinforcing- Why security clearance process is a barrier to entryThe podcast features a discussion of transitioning technology across the "valley of death" to a program of record. Matt applauds government efforts to make it easier for new entrants to get small government contracts. However, it often takes years to get funding lined up through a program office. While large incumbents can manage the system by having a portfolio of projects at various stages, new entrants may face a gap in revenues for multiple years. As Matt reminds us, Anduril didn't even exist when this year's budgets were being planned more than two years ago.In order to bridge the valley of death, Matt recommends small companies field capabilities early and have honest conversations with government about what it takes to stay viable. He also provides three things the DoD can do that will allow industry to rise up and participate. (1) recompete programs more often; (2)  if the winner is new, be willing to move larger amounts of funds; and (3) increase flexibility to move funding within the fiscal year.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

Matt Steckman joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss about a wide range of issues facing growth-stage companies in the defense industry. He is the Chief Revenue Officer of Anduril Industries. Topics include: - Edge computing and the future of artificial intelligence - How to think about risk taking in product development - The beauty of the Air Force's approach enterprise tools - How cost and pricing data becomes self-reinforcing - Why security clearance process is a barrier to entry The podcast features a discussion of transitioning technology across the "valley of death" to a program of record. Matt applauds government efforts to make it easier for new entrants to get small government contracts. However, it often takes years to get funding lined up through a program office. While large incumbents can manage the system by having a portfolio of projects at various stages, new entrants may face a gap in revenues for multiple years. As Matt reminds us, Anduril didn't even exist when this year's budgets were being planned more than two years ago. In order to bridge the valley of death, Matt recommends small companies field capabilities early and have honest conversations with government about what it takes to stay viable. He also provides three things the DoD can do that will allow industry to rise up and participate. (1) recompete programs more often; (2)  if the winner is new, be willing to move larger amounts of funds; and (3) increase flexibility to move funding within the fiscal year. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

Leaping the valley of death with Matt Steckman

Andrew Hunter

Andrew Hunter, director of the defense-industrial group at CSIS, joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss a set of papers on adaptable systems, or systems that are hardware-based but software-defined. One of the defining features of adaptable systems is that they can be upgraded on shorter time frames than the usual 5+ year block upgrade cycle that traditional platforms have gone through. Yet the acquisition system is strained to accommodate agile developments. We discuss challenges including budget flexibility, the requirements process, Earned Value Management, cost and pricing data, the program office structure, and more.The discussion also touches on acquisition reform, including the breakup of the Acquisition, Technology, &amp; Logistics office into two undersecretaries -- one for Research &amp; Engineering and another for Acquisition &amp; Sustainment. Andrew discusses why he was skeptical of the reform early on, and how he thinks it can work out. One issue is the messaging about culture, and how USD(A&amp;S) cannot be thought of as simply cost conscious, but must be innovative as well. Another issue is the idea that USD(R&amp;E) might take over the Milestone A decision initiating prototyping, but doesn't expect much to change because Milestone A is often viewed as optional for starting a new program of record.The podcast finishes up with a discussion of the industrial base. We talk about innovation hubs and whether they are lowering barriers to entry, the decline and now stabilization of new firm entry into defense, the difficulties of small business graduation into larger firms, and how he will keep an eye on further consolidation.I'd like to thank Andrew for joining me on the Acquisition Talk podcast. Be sure to check out his reports available at the CSIS website, including those on adaptable systems here and here and the excellent report on small business graduation. He also has hosted some of the episodes of the CSIS podcast, including one with Dr. William Roper and another on Small Businesses. Andrew is frequently sought out for comment at major outlets, as well at congressional hearings including Shortening the Defense Acquisition Cycle, Contracting and the Industrial Base, and U.S. Ground Force Capability and Modernization Challenges in Eastern Europe. Here is a good video of Andrew discussing Artificial Intelligence.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

Andrew Hunter, director of the defense-industrial group at CSIS, joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss a set of papers on adaptable systems, or systems that are hardware-based but software-defined. One of the defining features of adaptable systems is that they can be upgraded on shorter time frames than the usual 5+ year block upgrade cycle that traditional platforms have gone through. Yet the acquisition system is strained to accommodate agile developments. We discuss challenges including budget flexibility, the requirements process, Earned Value Management, cost and pricing data, the program office structure, and more. The discussion also touches on acquisition reform, including the breakup of the Acquisition, Technology, &amp; Logistics office into two undersecretaries -- one for Research &amp; Engineering and another for Acquisition &amp; Sustainment. Andrew discusses why he was skeptical of the reform early on, and how he thinks it can work out. One issue is the messaging about culture, and how USD(A&amp;S) cannot be thought of as simply cost conscious, but must be innovative as well. Another issue is the idea that USD(R&amp;E) might take over the Milestone A decision initiating prototyping, but doesn't expect much to change because Milestone A is often viewed as optional for starting a new program of record. The podcast finishes up with a discussion of the industrial base. We talk about innovation hubs and whether they are lowering barriers to entry, the decline and now stabilization of new firm entry into defense, the difficulties of small business graduation into larger firms, and how he will keep an eye on further consolidation. I'd like to thank Andrew for joining me on the Acquisition Talk podcast. Be sure to check out his reports available at the CSIS website, including those on adaptable systems here and here and the excellent report on small business graduation. He also has hosted some of the episodes of the CSIS podcast, including one with Dr. William Roper and another on Small Businesses. Andrew is frequently sought out for comment at major outlets, as well at congressional hearings including Shortening the Defense Acquisition Cycle, Contracting and the Industrial Base, and U.S. Ground Force Capability and Modernization Challenges in Eastern Europe. Here is a good video of Andrew discussing Artificial Intelligence. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

Software-defined, hardware-based adaptable systems with Andrew Hunter

James Hasik

Jim Hasik joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss a wide range of topics. He was a former naval officer and long time industry consultant, now with the Center for Government Contracting at GMU and Renaissance Strategic Advisers. During the episode, I ask Jim to reflect on why the Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives rode into the sunset, how he views the proposed UTC-Raytheon merger, why there is a certain arrogance about "should cost" studies, the impact of Buy American laws such as those affecting the FFG(X) program, how we can bend the cost curve to put an end to one of Augustine's infamous laws, and what Peter Thiel meant when he said "competition is for losers."The episode also features a discussion of the B-21 Raider. Jim says there is not much publicly known about the manned bomber program, but argues that more consideration should have been given to making the system remotely piloted. He discusses the tradeoffs in platform design, and speculates on reasons why the Air Force chose to make it manned. Some issues include targeting mobile objectives, the role of culture, and survivability of remote piloting with the increasing vulnerability of space communications.Jim provides a primer in the challenges of intellectual property as well, a topic which has seen some debate and new policy rollouts in the Army. He discusses three situations in which government may need to purchase intellectual property, including for repair, modifications, and system re-buys. In such circumstances, the original system developer may gain a monopoly position, but not in the traditional sense because it is a regulated monopoly dealing with a monopsony customer (single-buyer). Jim illuminates how a fair deal can be struck because government and contractors have different time-values of money.I'd like to thank Jim for coming on the Acquisition Talk podcast. Be sure to check out his books including Arms and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and Alliances in the Twenty-First Century Defense Industry and The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare. He has a new book coming out from Texas A&amp;M based on his dissertation, MRAP: Marking Military Innovation. You can find his website/blog here, and he has also been featured on defense outlets like Defense News. Here is Jim on Government Matters discussing the revolving door.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

Jim Hasik joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss a wide range of topics. He was a former naval officer and long time industry consultant, now with the Center for Government Contracting at GMU and Renaissance Strategic Advisers. During the episode, I ask Jim to reflect on why the Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives rode into the sunset, how he views the proposed UTC-Raytheon merger, why there is a certain arrogance about "should cost" studies, the impact of Buy American laws such as those affecting the FFG(X) program, how we can bend the cost curve to put an end to one of Augustine's infamous laws, and what Peter Thiel meant when he said "competition is for losers." The episode also features a discussion of the B-21 Raider. Jim says there is not much publicly known about the manned bomber program, but argues that more consideration should have been given to making the system remotely piloted. He discusses the tradeoffs in platform design, and speculates on reasons why the Air Force chose to make it manned. Some issues include targeting mobile objectives, the role of culture, and survivability of remote piloting with the increasing vulnerability of space communications. Jim provides a primer in the challenges of intellectual property as well, a topic which has seen some debate and new policy rollouts in the Army. He discusses three situations in which government may need to purchase intellectual property, including for repair, modifications, and system re-buys. In such circumstances, the original system developer may gain a monopoly position, but not in the traditional sense because it is a regulated monopoly dealing with a monopsony customer (single-buyer). Jim illuminates how a fair deal can be struck because government and contractors have different time-values of money. I'd like to thank Jim for coming on the Acquisition Talk podcast. Be sure to check out his books including Arms and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and Alliances in the Twenty-First Century Defense Industry and The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare. He has a new book coming out from Texas A&amp;M based on his dissertation, MRAP: Marking Military Innovation. You can find his website/blog here, and he has also been featured on defense outlets like Defense News. Here is Jim on Government Matters discussing the revolving door. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

The defense industry, intellectual property, the B-21, and more with James Hasik

Don Vandergriff

I was pleased to have Don Vandergriff on the Acquistion Talk podcast. Don is a prolific educator of military training and strategy, and he has a new book out, Adopting Mission Command. During the episode, we discuss how modern organizations have been built around notions scientific management developed by people like Frederick Winslow Taylor. These methods are great for well-defined problems which can be broken down into sequential steps and optimized. It led to an education system that values checklist procedures and creating interchangeable workers for an assembly line.For many years Don has been at the forefront of pushing military training to go beyond Taylorism. He looks to the wisdom of German methods of mission command, or auftragstaktik, that flourished toward the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. The basic idea is to determine commanders intent and allow subordinates to interpret the intent while making decisions which may alter the plan depending on fast changing circumstances. This requires a type of training that produces critical thinkers and decisive decision-makers rather than training that emphasizes process without regard for context.During the episode, we discuss outcomes based training and education, the impact of centralization and hierarchy, how to learn from mistakes, the role of moral courage, why mission command is a two-way street, how difficult it is to write a good intent, and much more. The principles discussed by Don are applicable to defense acquisition as well. Both military operations and acquisition are highly uncertain environments with fast changing information. Building a positive culture based on trust can vastly improve effectiveness by delegating responsibility within the scope of commander's intent -- rather than detailing a laundry list of parameters to be measured by.I'd like to thank Don for joining me on Acquisition Talk. Be sure to check out all of Don's books on Amazon. Here is a good selection of articles and videos, as well as a good article on "The U.S. Army Culture is French!" Be sure to check out his three excellent episodes on the POGO podcast, two of which are with the estimable Bruce Gudmundsson: "Tactical Decision Games," "Military Personnel Reform," and "Mission Command." Don also recommends a book from Martin Samuels, "Piercing the Fog of War."

I was pleased to have Don Vandergriff on the Acquistion Talk podcast. Don is a prolific educator of military training and strategy, and he has a new book out, Adopting Mission Command. During the episode, we discuss how modern organizations have been built around notions scientific management developed by people like Frederick Winslow Taylor. These methods are great for well-defined problems which can be broken down into sequential steps and optimized. It led to an education system that values checklist procedures and creating interchangeable workers for an assembly line. For many years Don has been at the forefront of pushing military training to go beyond Taylorism. He looks to the wisdom of German methods of mission command, or auftragstaktik, that flourished toward the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. The basic idea is to determine commanders intent and allow subordinates to interpret the intent while making decisions which may alter the plan depending on fast changing circumstances. This requires a type of training that produces critical thinkers and decisive decision-makers rather than training that emphasizes process without regard for context. During the episode, we discuss outcomes based training and education, the impact of centralization and hierarchy, how to learn from mistakes, the role of moral courage, why mission command is a two-way street, how difficult it is to write a good intent, and much more. The principles discussed by Don are applicable to defense acquisition as well. Both military operations and acquisition are highly uncertain environments with fast changing information. Building a positive culture based on trust can vastly improve effectiveness by delegating responsibility within the scope of commander's intent -- rather than detailing a laundry list of parameters to be measured by. I'd like to thank Don for joining me on Acquisition Talk. Be sure to check out all of Don's books on Amazon. Here is a good selection of articles and videos, as well as a good article on "The U.S. Army Culture is French!" Be sure to check out his three excellent episodes on the POGO podcast, two of which are with the estimable Bruce Gudmundsson: "Tactical Decision Games," "Military Personnel Reform," and "Mission Command." Don also recommends a book from Martin Samuels, "Piercing the Fog of War."

Dropping Taylorism and adopting mission command with Don Vandergriff

William Hartung

William Hartung joins me to discuss his book, Prophets of War: Lockheed Martin and the Making of the Military-Industrial Complex. In the episode, we discuss many of the defining moments of the defense industrial base, including: contract terms and cost overruns on the C-5A during the 1960s; the Lockheed bail out and international bribery scandals of the 1970s; the spare-parts pricing scandals of the 1980s, such as the $600 toilet seat; and the industry consolidation in the post-Cold War 1990s.We also touch on how Congress gets involved in weapon systems decisions; why a dollar spent on the defense industry doesn't produce as many jobs as investments in healthcare, education, and infrastructure; whether contractors can be considered specialists in government compliance; and much more.I'd like to thank Bill for joining me on Acquisition Talk. Be sure to check out some of other work, such as his Twitter feed, articles at The Nation, Defense One, The Mises Institute,  his other books on Amazon. Check out his official page at the Center for International Policy.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

William Hartung joins me to discuss his book, Prophets of War: Lockheed Martin and the Making of the Military-Industrial Complex. In the episode, we discuss many of the defining moments of the defense industrial base, including: contract terms and cost overruns on the C-5A during the 1960s; the Lockheed bail out and international bribery scandals of the 1970s; the spare-parts pricing scandals of the 1980s, such as the $600 toilet seat; and the industry consolidation in the post-Cold War 1990s. We also touch on how Congress gets involved in weapon systems decisions; why a dollar spent on the defense industry doesn't produce as many jobs as investments in healthcare, education, and infrastructure; whether contractors can be considered specialists in government compliance; and much more. I'd like to thank Bill for joining me on Acquisition Talk. Be sure to check out some of other work, such as his Twitter feed, articles at The Nation, Defense One, The Mises Institute,  his other books on Amazon. Check out his official page at the Center for International Policy. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

Lockheed Martin and the Military-Industrial Complex with William Hartung

Edward Keating

Edward Keating joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to talk about a wide range of issues. He is the Deputy Assistant Director for National Security at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and before that, he was a longtime RAND analyst researching a number of areas including sustainment, shipbuilding, and compensation.Edward provides us insights into the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding plan, how preventative maintenance can create lasting impacts, whether cost escalation can persistently outpace economy-wide inflation, if defense planning should focus on inputs or outputs, how modern ships are floating computers, why acquisition history is important, and much more.In the episode, we discuss Edward’s excellent article in the Acquisition Review Journal, “Approaches to F-35 Depot-Level Maintenance: Insights from Other Systems.” It showed readiness and cost-per-flying-hour data for a variety of fighter aircraft. We discuss the data, and how there is a great deal of heterogeneity depending on the aircraft model or even the tail number.Edward sets me straight about my characterization of the F-35. Neither is cost-per-flying hour the sole determinate of sustainment costs, nor is the $1 trillion lifecycle figure cited useful for thinking about the opportunity cost. For example, the $1 trillion lifecycle estimate of the sustainment cost includes anticipated inflation, which over many decades amounts to a sizeable proportion of the figure.

Edward Keating joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to talk about a wide range of issues. He is the Deputy Assistant Director for National Security at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and before that, he was a longtime RAND analyst researching a number of areas including sustainment, shipbuilding, and compensation. Edward provides us insights into the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding plan, how preventative maintenance can create lasting impacts, whether cost escalation can persistently outpace economy-wide inflation, if defense planning should focus on inputs or outputs, how modern ships are floating computers, why acquisition history is important, and much more. In the episode, we discuss Edward’s excellent article in the Acquisition Review Journal, “Approaches to F-35 Depot-Level Maintenance: Insights from Other Systems.” It showed readiness and cost-per-flying-hour data for a variety of fighter aircraft. We discuss the data, and how there is a great deal of heterogeneity depending on the aircraft model or even the tail number. Edward sets me straight about my characterization of the F-35. Neither is cost-per-flying hour the sole determinate of sustainment costs, nor is the $1 trillion lifecycle figure cited useful for thinking about the opportunity cost. For example, the $1 trillion lifecycle estimate of the sustainment cost includes anticipated inflation, which over many decades amounts to a sizeable proportion of the figure.

Weapons sustainment and CBO analyses with Edward Keating

In this episode of Acquisition Talk, we’ll listen in on a panel discussion hosted by the Lincoln Network that focuses on defense acquisition, called, “From the Lab to the Battlefield: maximizing defense innovation.” This event took place during the Reboot American Innovation conference on May 2, 2019.The speakers include Linda Lourie, who is the Associate General Counsel for Acquisition &amp; Logistics –- Pablo Carrillo, the former chief of staff to Senator John McCain and a current counsel for Squire Patton Boggs -- and Acquisition Talk host Eric Lofgren. The panel is moderated by Pasha Moore.This discussion touches on the difficulty of lining up funding for new programs, the successes of the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), the roll-out of the DOD's new trusted capital marketplace -- which seeks to identify companies with critical technologies for U.S. investment, bridging the divide between the DOD and tech, barriers to entry for new firms to win major programs, and much more. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

In this episode of Acquisition Talk, we’ll listen in on a panel discussion hosted by the Lincoln Network that focuses on defense acquisition, called, “From the Lab to the Battlefield: maximizing defense innovation.” This event took place during the Reboot American Innovation conference on May 2, 2019. The speakers include Linda Lourie, who is the Associate General Counsel for Acquisition &amp; Logistics –- Pablo Carrillo, the former chief of staff to Senator John McCain and a current counsel for Squire Patton Boggs -- and Acquisition Talk host Eric Lofgren. The panel is moderated by Pasha Moore. This discussion touches on the difficulty of lining up funding for new programs, the successes of the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), the roll-out of the DOD's new trusted capital marketplace -- which seeks to identify companies with critical technologies for U.S. investment, bridging the divide between the DOD and tech, barriers to entry for new firms to win major programs, and much more. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

Panel: From the Lab to the Battlefield

Will Thomas

I was pleased to speak with Will Thomas on the Acquisition Talk podcast. He is a senior science policy analyst at the American Institute of Physics, and is a historian of science and technology. His book is Rational Action: The Sciences of Policy in Britain and America, 1940-1960. There is a ton of interesting facts and useful analysis in the history of how the military learned how to learn, with clear application for today's debates on innovation.During the discussion we touch on a wide-range of issues, including the origins of operations research, whether a market in defense can actually exist, the separation of R&amp;D from production -- and whether software considerations have changed the logic, the uses of technology readiness levels, similarities and differences between healthcare and defense, and the experience of Donald Trump's uncle, John, who was head of the British Branch of MIT's radiation lab during WWII.The talk features an analysis of the debate in RAND between systems analysts like ES Quade and luminary economists like Kenneth Arrow and Armen Alchian, who favored a sequential decision-making in R&amp;D due to the prevalence of uncertainty. I tried to pick apart some distinctions between Arrow and Alchian, characterizing the former as more of an optimizer using an allocation paradigm and the latter as more evolutionary using an exchange paradigm. Will responds that I was over-interpreting Arrow, and that the goal of both was to support policies of government support to exploratory development without locking in technical configurations prematurely.I'd like to thank Will for joining me on the Acquisition Talk podcast. Be sure to check out his website which includes links to his book Rational Action and nearly a dozen fascinating articles. Here is his paper on Donald Trump's uncle, "A profile of John Trump, Donald’s oft-mentioned scientist uncle." His Twitter handle is @GWilliamThomas and he occasionally blogs at EtherWave. Will also recommends reading David Edgerton, among others, on the history of science and technology.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

I was pleased to speak with Will Thomas on the Acquisition Talk podcast. He is a senior science policy analyst at the American Institute of Physics, and is a historian of science and technology. His book is Rational Action: The Sciences of Policy in Britain and America, 1940-1960. There is a ton of interesting facts and useful analysis in the history of how the military learned how to learn, with clear application for today's debates on innovation. During the discussion we touch on a wide-range of issues, including the origins of operations research, whether a market in defense can actually exist, the separation of R&amp;D from production -- and whether software considerations have changed the logic, the uses of technology readiness levels, similarities and differences between healthcare and defense, and the experience of Donald Trump's uncle, John, who was head of the British Branch of MIT's radiation lab during WWII. The talk features an analysis of the debate in RAND between systems analysts like ES Quade and luminary economists like Kenneth Arrow and Armen Alchian, who favored a sequential decision-making in R&amp;D due to the prevalence of uncertainty. I tried to pick apart some distinctions between Arrow and Alchian, characterizing the former as more of an optimizer using an allocation paradigm and the latter as more evolutionary using an exchange paradigm. Will responds that I was over-interpreting Arrow, and that the goal of both was to support policies of government support to exploratory development without locking in technical configurations prematurely. I'd like to thank Will for joining me on the Acquisition Talk podcast. Be sure to check out his website which includes links to his book Rational Action and nearly a dozen fascinating articles. Here is his paper on Donald Trump's uncle, "A profile of John Trump, Donald’s oft-mentioned scientist uncle." His Twitter handle is @GWilliamThomas and he occasionally blogs at EtherWave. Will also recommends reading David Edgerton, among others, on the history of science and technology. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

The history and sciences of R&D policy with Will Thomas

Richard Dunn

In this episode of the Acquisition Talk podcast, I speak with Richard Dunn about commercial contracting, and in particular, Other Transactions Authority(OTAs). He is the founder of the Strategic Institute, and has had a long career in government including General Counsel of DARPA.Rick argues that the traditional Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) does not have enough flexibility to allow for commercial contracting. Instead of focusing on value and innovation, the FAR narrows government's focus on cost. The system is "fundamentally unfair," he said. If it were fair, we should expect to see greater business participation. One study found that just the top ten regulations contribute to an 18 percent cost premium. Why would any firm take on that cost at the expense of being noncompetitive in their commercial markets?Other Transactions, by contrast, allow the government to legally negotiate terms and conditions without reference to the FAR. In other words, the government can do business like any commercial firm, leading to lower transaction costs. However, the adoption of OTs have been stymied for decades because of proactive resistance. Preexisting learning stops subsequent learning, and contracting officers tend to think in terms of FAR language. Rick suggests how to break out of that mindset.During the conversation, we discussed:- The reason Norm Augustine said Lockheed couldn't do commercial business- How contract regulations became so burdensome- Why are most OT consortia are only "so-called" consortia- The effect of telling contract officers they will go to jail for non-compliance- How OTs "shop problems" while the FAR "shops requirements"- How startups can use unfunded OTs to gain access to government capital and users- Why payable milestones are outside of the FAR- The history of OTs, including Paul Demling, NASA, and the Telestar satelliteThis podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

In this episode of the Acquisition Talk podcast, I speak with Richard Dunn about commercial contracting, and in particular, Other Transactions Authority(OTAs). He is the founder of the Strategic Institute, and has had a long career in government including General Counsel of DARPA. Rick argues that the traditional Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) does not have enough flexibility to allow for commercial contracting. Instead of focusing on value and innovation, the FAR narrows government's focus on cost. The system is "fundamentally unfair," he said. If it were fair, we should expect to see greater business participation. One study found that just the top ten regulations contribute to an 18 percent cost premium. Why would any firm take on that cost at the expense of being noncompetitive in their commercial markets? Other Transactions, by contrast, allow the government to legally negotiate terms and conditions without reference to the FAR. In other words, the government can do business like any commercial firm, leading to lower transaction costs. However, the adoption of OTs have been stymied for decades because of proactive resistance. Preexisting learning stops subsequent learning, and contracting officers tend to think in terms of FAR language. Rick suggests how to break out of that mindset. During the conversation, we discussed: - The reason Norm Augustine said Lockheed couldn't do commercial business - How contract regulations became so burdensome - Why are most OT consortia are only "so-called" consortia - The effect of telling contract officers they will go to jail for non-compliance - How OTs "shop problems" while the FAR "shops requirements" - How startups can use unfunded OTs to gain access to government capital and users - Why payable milestones are outside of the FAR - The history of OTs, including Paul Demling, NASA, and the Telestar satellite This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

All about Other Transactions Authority (OTAs) with Richard Dunn

Richard Connolly

Dr. Richard Connolly joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss a wide range of issues, including Russia's GPV modernization programs, the effect of sanctions, whether Russia can produce hypersonics in large numbers, dependence on oil, access to commercial technology, and even acquisition reform in the United Kingdom. Dr. Connolly is the director of the Center for Russian, European, and Eurasian Studies (CREES) at Birmingham University, and he is an Associate Fellow at Chatham House.The discussion features an argument Dr. Connolly made about how to convert Russian military spending from rubles to dollars. The standard methodology uses the Market Exchange Rate (MER), which puts Russia's economy on the same level as Spain's and their military spending comes out to around $61 billion. That may give the misleading impression that Russia's military capability is perhaps less than one-tenth that of the United States. Dr. Connolly convincingly argues that the Purchasing Power Parity is a better measure, in which case Russia's perceived military spending increases to $160 billion.The MER reflects the supply and demand for rubles in US dollars to balance trade. The problem is that traded goods are not reflective of prices Russia's military planners face. For example, food, housing, haircuts, and worker salaries are not reflected in the MER. Even after adjusting for the MER, consumer prices are less than half as much as they are in the United States -- meaning Russia's military planners can afford more.The PPP provides a more apples-to-apples comparison. Preliminary results from Dr. Connolly's efforts to construct a PPP for military inputs show that it is close to the same value as the PPP for consumer goods. Dr. Connolly concludes that the PPP is roughly right whereas the MER is precisely wrong. The same is likely true of other low-income countries like China and Iran.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

Dr. Richard Connolly joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss a wide range of issues, including Russia's GPV modernization programs, the effect of sanctions, whether Russia can produce hypersonics in large numbers, dependence on oil, access to commercial technology, and even acquisition reform in the United Kingdom. Dr. Connolly is the director of the Center for Russian, European, and Eurasian Studies (CREES) at Birmingham University, and he is an Associate Fellow at Chatham House. The discussion features an argument Dr. Connolly made about how to convert Russian military spending from rubles to dollars. The standard methodology uses the Market Exchange Rate (MER), which puts Russia's economy on the same level as Spain's and their military spending comes out to around $61 billion. That may give the misleading impression that Russia's military capability is perhaps less than one-tenth that of the United States. Dr. Connolly convincingly argues that the Purchasing Power Parity is a better measure, in which case Russia's perceived military spending increases to $160 billion. The MER reflects the supply and demand for rubles in US dollars to balance trade. The problem is that traded goods are not reflective of prices Russia's military planners face. For example, food, housing, haircuts, and worker salaries are not reflected in the MER. Even after adjusting for the MER, consumer prices are less than half as much as they are in the United States -- meaning Russia's military planners can afford more. The PPP provides a more apples-to-apples comparison. Preliminary results from Dr. Connolly's efforts to construct a PPP for military inputs show that it is close to the same value as the PPP for consumer goods. Dr. Connolly concludes that the PPP is roughly right whereas the MER is precisely wrong. The same is likely true of other low-income countries like China and Iran. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

Russia's military procurement with Richard Connolly

Todd Harrison

Todd Harrison joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss a wide range of issues, including how the reorganization of defense space forces is shaping up, why real authority in Washington is budget authority, whether rapid acquisition authorities are here to stay, why the KC-46A tanker program should be considered a success, and much more.The episode features a discussion of the on-going space re-organization. Todd explained how the DOD’s growing reliance on space capabilities is also creating risks. Many other nations are rapidly gaining capabilities to deploy effective countermeasures. The lack of effective responses from the Air Force has brought criticism from Washington. Proponents for a Space Force argue that space is a distinct profession, with its own mission, culture, and technologies.We learn about the various players in defense space and prospects for the future. Todd believes that more of the responsibilities for space, currently spread among out among the services and OSD, should be consolidated into the Space Force. He makes allusions to when the Air Force was separated from the Army, and that the separation of responsibilities perhaps didn’t go far enough. I push back, citing the benefits of diversity and competition. Todd responds that diversity should still exist, but we won’t have the unnecessary duplication of platforms when all that is needed is a new payload.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

Todd Harrison joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss a wide range of issues, including how the reorganization of defense space forces is shaping up, why real authority in Washington is budget authority, whether rapid acquisition authorities are here to stay, why the KC-46A tanker program should be considered a success, and much more. The episode features a discussion of the on-going space re-organization. Todd explained how the DOD’s growing reliance on space capabilities is also creating risks. Many other nations are rapidly gaining capabilities to deploy effective countermeasures. The lack of effective responses from the Air Force has brought criticism from Washington. Proponents for a Space Force argue that space is a distinct profession, with its own mission, culture, and technologies. We learn about the various players in defense space and prospects for the future. Todd believes that more of the responsibilities for space, currently spread among out among the services and OSD, should be consolidated into the Space Force. He makes allusions to when the Air Force was separated from the Army, and that the separation of responsibilities perhaps didn’t go far enough. I push back, citing the benefits of diversity and competition. Todd responds that diversity should still exist, but we won’t have the unnecessary duplication of platforms when all that is needed is a new payload. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

The military space reorg. and everything else with Todd Harrison

Bruce Gudmundsson

Bruce Gudmundsson joins me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss the great work he is doing down in Quantico putting together case studies on military operations and acquisition. The case studies are different than you might see in business schools. He takes historical situations and puts you in the shoes of a central character. Bruce provides a lecture on the background, gives statistics and other images that help you understand the terrain or technology, and then at critical junctures in the story, he asks, "what would you do?" These "decision-forcing case studies" are at the intersection of the traditional case study method, decision games, and the Socratic conversation.The podcast starts by introducing the audience to an accelerated version of a decision-forcing case study, one where we play the part of Emile Rimaihlo, a French artillery engineer. We learn about the technology, the conundrums he faced, and the major consequences of those decisions on the battlefields of World War I. We also discuss the French arsenal system of manufacturing, howitzer gun technology, Bruce's fondness of paradoxes, advice for reading, how Ben Franklin appreciated Socrates, how case studies impart upon the student humility, an ability to handle ambiguity, and a bias towards action, and much more.Bruce also took part in the Quantico Renaissance, which led to the development of updated Marine Corps doctrine that pivoted away from linear fronts and hierarchy to an appreciation of nonlinearity and uncertainty in combat. I ask Bruce whether such a reform is possible in defense acquisition as well.There are three opportunities each week to take part in decision-forcing case studies with Bruce Gudmundsson. There is an in-person Thursday class at 4:30pm in Quantico, and there are two online classes Tuesday at 7:30pm and Friday at 10:30pm (all times Eastern Standard). I highly recommend giving his class a try. It's free, fun, and not intimidating in the least. You'll probably find me in an online class most weeks.You can learn more by visiting http://teachusmc.blogspot.com and emailing Bruce at decision.forcing.case@gmail.com. He will provide you information and links to join the sessions. Also, be sure to check out Bruce's fantastic books, which are available on Amazon, as well as other podcast episodes featuring Bruce, such as at POGO and All Marine Radio.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

Bruce Gudmundsson joins me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss the great work he is doing down in Quantico putting together case studies on military operations and acquisition. The case studies are different than you might see in business schools. He takes historical situations and puts you in the shoes of a central character. Bruce provides a lecture on the background, gives statistics and other images that help you understand the terrain or technology, and then at critical junctures in the story, he asks, "what would you do?" These "decision-forcing case studies" are at the intersection of the traditional case study method, decision games, and the Socratic conversation. The podcast starts by introducing the audience to an accelerated version of a decision-forcing case study, one where we play the part of Emile Rimaihlo, a French artillery engineer. We learn about the technology, the conundrums he faced, and the major consequences of those decisions on the battlefields of World War I. We also discuss the French arsenal system of manufacturing, howitzer gun technology, Bruce's fondness of paradoxes, advice for reading, how Ben Franklin appreciated Socrates, how case studies impart upon the student humility, an ability to handle ambiguity, and a bias towards action, and much more. Bruce also took part in the Quantico Renaissance, which led to the development of updated Marine Corps doctrine that pivoted away from linear fronts and hierarchy to an appreciation of nonlinearity and uncertainty in combat. I ask Bruce whether such a reform is possible in defense acquisition as well. There are three opportunities each week to take part in decision-forcing case studies with Bruce Gudmundsson. There is an in-person Thursday class at 4:30pm in Quantico, and there are two online classes Tuesday at 7:30pm and Friday at 10:30pm (all times Eastern Standard). I highly recommend giving his class a try. It's free, fun, and not intimidating in the least. You'll probably find me in an online class most weeks. You can learn more by visiting <a href="http://teachusmc.blogspot.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">http://teachusmc.blogspot.com</a> and emailing Bruce at decision.forcing.case@gmail.com. He will provide you information and links to join the sessions. Also, be sure to check out Bruce's fantastic books, which are available on Amazon, as well as other podcast episodes featuring Bruce, such as at POGO and All Marine Radio. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

Learning by decision-forcing case studies with Bruce Gudmundsson

Mark Mandeles

In this episode Mark and I talk about whether science is slowing down, the benefits of positive feedback loops, what the central task of analysts ought to be, how we create high reliability organizations, what's the role of history in weapon system projects, and much more.I also ask Mark about how some of the great thinkers of the 20th century should impact our thinking about acquisition. From Charles Perrow on high reliability organizations and Martin Landau on the benefits of social redundancy, to Friedrich Hayek on the uses of knowledge and Herbert Simon on, well, almost everything. But Mark's favorite philosopher of the 20th century is Karl Popper, who has much to teach us on falsification, the growth of knowledge, and the open society.I again can't recommend enough reading through some of his great papers, mostly online for free at independent.academia.edu, including the B-52 Development book, Systems Design and Project Management Principles, and Needs and Opportunities in US Naval History which we discuss on the program. His books are also available to buy on Amazon.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

In this episode Mark and I talk about whether science is slowing down, the benefits of positive feedback loops, what the central task of analysts ought to be, how we create high reliability organizations, what's the role of history in weapon system projects, and much more. I also ask Mark about how some of the great thinkers of the 20th century should impact our thinking about acquisition. From Charles Perrow on high reliability organizations and Martin Landau on the benefits of social redundancy, to Friedrich Hayek on the uses of knowledge and Herbert Simon on, well, almost everything. But Mark's favorite philosopher of the 20th century is Karl Popper, who has much to teach us on falsification, the growth of knowledge, and the open society. I again can't recommend enough reading through some of his great papers, mostly online for free at <a href="http://independent.academia.edu" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">independent.academia.edu</a>, including the B-52 Development book, Systems Design and Project Management Principles, and Needs and Opportunities in US Naval History which we discuss on the program. His books are also available to buy on Amazon. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

Organizing for technology change with Mark Mandeles (part 2)

In this episode of Acquisition Talk, host Eric Lofgren speaks with Mark Mandeles about a wide range of topics in defense management. Mark has had a fascinating career and has written numerous books and articles including The Development of the B-52 and Jet Propulsion, and, Military Transformation Past and Present.Mark talks with me about how military organization impacted the innovation process, why it is impossible to predict the growth of scientific knowledge, how the B-52 development turned out to be a stunning success, the role of strong technical managers in a process-oriented culture, how the Air Force promised business efficiency to gain its independence, and much more.He also describes some big problems with the systems program office concept, as well as other aspects of the defense management process as laid out in the 5000 series regulations. Mark argues that traditional notions of business efficiency are ill-equipped to handle uncertainty. He recommends and provides examples of an alternative concept based on system design principles.Mark is a fantastic resource for thinking about complexity in defense management, and has been a constant source of inspiration. He has posted much of his writing online for free at Academia.edu, including the B-52 Development book, Systems Design and Project Management Principles, and Needs and Opportunities in US Naval History.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

In this episode of Acquisition Talk, host Eric Lofgren speaks with Mark Mandeles about a wide range of topics in defense management. Mark has had a fascinating career and has written numerous books and articles including The Development of the B-52 and Jet Propulsion, and, Military Transformation Past and Present. Mark talks with me about how military organization impacted the innovation process, why it is impossible to predict the growth of scientific knowledge, how the B-52 development turned out to be a stunning success, the role of strong technical managers in a process-oriented culture, how the Air Force promised business efficiency to gain its independence, and much more. He also describes some big problems with the systems program office concept, as well as other aspects of the defense management process as laid out in the 5000 series regulations. Mark argues that traditional notions of business efficiency are ill-equipped to handle uncertainty. He recommends and provides examples of an alternative concept based on system design principles. Mark is a fantastic resource for thinking about complexity in defense management, and has been a constant source of inspiration. He has posted much of his writing online for free at <a href="http://Academia.edu" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Academia.edu</a>, including the B-52 Development book, Systems Design and Project Management Principles, and Needs and Opportunities in US Naval History. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

System design principles with Mark Mandeles(part 1)

Soraya Correa

Soraya Correa joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss small business programs, the procurement innovation lab, workforce training programs, why contracting officers might be risk averse, industry engagement, and much more. She is the Chief Procurement Officer for the Department of Homeland Security, and one of our government's most impactful business leaders.During the episode, Ms. Correa describes how she has taken a different approach to acquisition reform. As we often see in the Pentagon and as it is instigated by Congress, acquisition reform usually means trying to streamline regulations while creating new parallel structures (e.g., middle-tier acquisition, urgent capabilities, software, etc.). Ms. Correa, however, recognized that many authorities already exist. Real change comes from focusing on developing and then empowering people. "I'm not trying to change the rules," she said, "I'm trying to change how we think about the rules."We discuss why, on the margin, leadership should focus on the inputs and trust that the outputs will take care of themselves. To that end, Ms. Correa has nurtured several workforce training and mentoring programs. Moreover, she set up an in-house "consultancy" to help those professionals innovate from the bottom up. The Federal Acquisition Regulation isn't overly restrictive, Ms. Correa finds, instead it is risk aversion on the part of the workforce. Using her leadership position and backed by a long tenure, Ms. Correa provides the necessary top cover to allow her workforce to execute great solutions.I'd like to thank Soraya Correa for joining me on the Acquisition Talk podcast. She has been a recurring guest on Government Matters, watch them all! She is a frequent communicator, numerous videos are available on You Tube. Another good interview is here, and you can find out her thoughts on business automation here. Listen to Ms. Correa on the "Let's Talk about IT" podcast. You can learn more about doing business with DHS here, and career opportunities are here.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

Soraya Correa joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss small business programs, the procurement innovation lab, workforce training programs, why contracting officers might be risk averse, industry engagement, and much more. She is the Chief Procurement Officer for the Department of Homeland Security, and one of our government's most impactful business leaders. During the episode, Ms. Correa describes how she has taken a different approach to acquisition reform. As we often see in the Pentagon and as it is instigated by Congress, acquisition reform usually means trying to streamline regulations while creating new parallel structures (e.g., middle-tier acquisition, urgent capabilities, software, etc.). Ms. Correa, however, recognized that many authorities already exist. Real change comes from focusing on developing and then empowering people. "I'm not trying to change the rules," she said, "I'm trying to change how we think about the rules." We discuss why, on the margin, leadership should focus on the inputs and trust that the outputs will take care of themselves. To that end, Ms. Correa has nurtured several workforce training and mentoring programs. Moreover, she set up an in-house "consultancy" to help those professionals innovate from the bottom up. The Federal Acquisition Regulation isn't overly restrictive, Ms. Correa finds, instead it is risk aversion on the part of the workforce. Using her leadership position and backed by a long tenure, Ms. Correa provides the necessary top cover to allow her workforce to execute great solutions. I'd like to thank Soraya Correa for joining me on the Acquisition Talk podcast. She has been a recurring guest on Government Matters, watch them all! She is a frequent communicator, numerous videos are available on You Tube. Another good interview is here, and you can find out her thoughts on business automation here. Listen to Ms. Correa on the "Let's Talk about IT" podcast. You can learn more about doing business with DHS here, and career opportunities are here. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

Getting the culture right with Soraya Correa

Tate Nurkin

Tate Nurkin joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss China's weapons technologies. He is the founder of the OTH Intelligence Group, and a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. We touch on a wide range of topics, including:Progress on civil-military integrationVolume and velocity in Chinese developmentAdvances in autonomous systems and drone swarmsThe fast pace of change in hypersonic missilesChina's PLA Navy shipbuildingHow the United States needs to work better with other countriesKai-Fu Lee's take on techno-utilitarianismThe Army's approach to Future Vertical LiftTate recognizes the rapid progress of China's progress since the watershed 2013-2014 reforms, and indeed the number of Chinese firms marketing unmanned systems. For example, China has successfully demonstrated swarms of 119 UAVs and 56 unmanned surface maritime vessels. However, he argues that we have a tendency to overplay the challenges facing the United States defense industry, and underplay those facing China.The Chinese defense industry still faces its own hurdles, including the inefficiency of state owned enterprises and persistent troubles developing aircraft engines. We should also treat the operational effectiveness of China's hypersonic missile, the DF-17, with a dose of skepticism. Yet overall, it is impressive how fast China can get new applications out into the field. This should force the United States to think hard about the way it conducts business, and how that can be sped up to match the threat.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

Tate Nurkin joined me on the Acquisition Talk podcast to discuss China's weapons technologies. He is the founder of the OTH Intelligence Group, and a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. We touch on a wide range of topics, including: Progress on civil-military integration Volume and velocity in Chinese development Advances in autonomous systems and drone swarms The fast pace of change in hypersonic missiles China's PLA Navy shipbuilding How the United States needs to work better with other countries Kai-Fu Lee's take on techno-utilitarianism The Army's approach to Future Vertical Lift Tate recognizes the rapid progress of China's progress since the watershed 2013-2014 reforms, and indeed the number of Chinese firms marketing unmanned systems. For example, China has successfully demonstrated swarms of 119 UAVs and 56 unmanned surface maritime vessels. However, he argues that we have a tendency to overplay the challenges facing the United States defense industry, and underplay those facing China. The Chinese defense industry still faces its own hurdles, including the inefficiency of state owned enterprises and persistent troubles developing aircraft engines. We should also treat the operational effectiveness of China's hypersonic missile, the DF-17, with a dose of skepticism. Yet overall, it is impressive how fast China can get new applications out into the field. This should force the United States to think hard about the way it conducts business, and how that can be sped up to match the threat. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

China's approach to military tech with Tate Nurkin

Mark Vandroff

I was pleased to have Mark Vandroff speak with me on the Acquisition Talk podcast. He served 30 years in the US Navy before retiring as a Captain, with his most recent positions including the Program Manager of the DDG-51 shipbuilding program (2012-2017) and Commander of the Carderock division of the Navy Surface Warfare Center (2017-2019).In the episode, we discuss why scientists and engineers should read the classics, how to manage large and complex organizations, why we must start with the end in mind, whether or not the Department of Defense is risk-adverse when it comes to acquisition, how a working capital fund really works, and lessons Mark learned from Sean Stackley -- including the "Stackley curve."The conversation features an analysis of the "valley of death" problem associated with transitioning new technologies from the labs into an official program of record. Mark argues that the principle cause of the "valley of death" is not the contract process -- which can be alleviated by skipping over the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) using special authorities -- but in fact is traced to the Planning-Programming-Budgeting-Execution (PPBE) process.Mark describes the coordination necessary for a program manager to make changes in the budget through what is called the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). He finds that there is no one responsible for taking new technologies from the lab to the program offices, whose managers couldn't know which emerging technologies needed the funding when their requests went in 3 years before. He argues that there needs to be a mission-based appropriation which provides additional flexibility. Mark warns us, however, not to carry that idea too far. Major new items like ships should still proceed through regular channels.I'd like to thank Mark for joining me on Acquisition Talk. Be sure to check out some of his great material, including articles discussed in the podcast "Power to the Polymath," "Reflections on Tailoring Leadership for a Perfect Fit," and his widely read article "Confessions of a Major Program Manager." Here is Mark providing a great lecture on acquisition using Star Wars as an analogy. Here he is being interviewed on DefenseNews. And I highly recommend listening to both of his episodes on Commander Salamander's Midrats podcast (on USN's Labs, Research Facilities, and Ranges -- and on Confessions of a Major Program Manager). He is also quite active on Twitter, follow him at @goatmaster89.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

I was pleased to have Mark Vandroff speak with me on the Acquisition Talk podcast. He served 30 years in the US Navy before retiring as a Captain, with his most recent positions including the Program Manager of the DDG-51 shipbuilding program (2012-2017) and Commander of the Carderock division of the Navy Surface Warfare Center (2017-2019). In the episode, we discuss why scientists and engineers should read the classics, how to manage large and complex organizations, why we must start with the end in mind, whether or not the Department of Defense is risk-adverse when it comes to acquisition, how a working capital fund really works, and lessons Mark learned from Sean Stackley -- including the "Stackley curve." The conversation features an analysis of the "valley of death" problem associated with transitioning new technologies from the labs into an official program of record. Mark argues that the principle cause of the "valley of death" is not the contract process -- which can be alleviated by skipping over the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) using special authorities -- but in fact is traced to the Planning-Programming-Budgeting-Execution (PPBE) process. Mark describes the coordination necessary for a program manager to make changes in the budget through what is called the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). He finds that there is no one responsible for taking new technologies from the lab to the program offices, whose managers couldn't know which emerging technologies needed the funding when their requests went in 3 years before. He argues that there needs to be a mission-based appropriation which provides additional flexibility. Mark warns us, however, not to carry that idea too far. Major new items like ships should still proceed through regular channels. I'd like to thank Mark for joining me on Acquisition Talk. Be sure to check out some of his great material, including articles discussed in the podcast "Power to the Polymath," "Reflections on Tailoring Leadership for a Perfect Fit," and his widely read article "Confessions of a Major Program Manager." Here is Mark providing a great lecture on acquisition using Star Wars as an analogy. Here he is being interviewed on DefenseNews. And I highly recommend listening to both of his episodes on Commander Salamander's Midrats podcast (on USN's Labs, Research Facilities, and Ranges -- and on Confessions of a Major Program Manager). He is also quite active on Twitter, follow him at @goatmaster89. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

People, process, and delegation with Capt. Mark Vandroff (ret.)

John Kuehn

In this episode of Acquisition Talk, I speak with Dr. John Kuehn. He is a professor of military history at the Army Command and General Staff College and former naval aviator. We discussed innovation in the interwar Navy, how the Falklands War provided a glimpse into the future of warfare, the new Space Force, whether constraints may propel innovation, what we can learn from Arthur C. Clarke, how the Netherlands invented wolfpack submarine tactics, and much more.We had an in depth discussion of two of John's books, Agents of Innovation and America's First General Staff. The Navy's General Board helped bring about the force that won World War II. One of the many aspects of its wisdom was withholding judgment until after experimentation. Change was helped along by post-World War I arms reduction treaties which limited capital shipbuilding and banned overseas bases in the Pacific. This led to gradual innovation away from the battleship and toward sea-based logistics, floating dry docks, long range submarines, carrier aviation, and more. John argues that a paucity of resources created an imperative to innovate.The discussion turns to the 21st century. John argued a new arms reduction treaty would benefit the US and the world. While he doesn't think budgets should be drastically cut, he is no fan of largess. A holiday on aircraft carrier construction, for example, would force military planners to really grapple with new challenges like anti-access. I ask about whether China would agree to limitations. Listen to the whole thing to hear his contrarian -- and well-informed -- point of view.I'd like to thank John for joining me on the Acquisition Talk podcast. Check out all of his books available on Amazon. I've uploaded John's excellent 2017 report to the CNO on Fleet Design. Watch some of his lectures available on YouTube. Here is a nice paper from John's student, Innovation from the Sea, on unmanned aerial vehicle policy. He recommends that you check out a great PowerPoint presentation from Jim Corum, Development of German Army Operational Doctrine in the Interwar Period.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

In this episode of Acquisition Talk, I speak with Dr. John Kuehn. He is a professor of military history at the Army Command and General Staff College and former naval aviator. We discussed innovation in the interwar Navy, how the Falklands War provided a glimpse into the future of warfare, the new Space Force, whether constraints may propel innovation, what we can learn from Arthur C. Clarke, how the Netherlands invented wolfpack submarine tactics, and much more. We had an in depth discussion of two of John's books, Agents of Innovation and America's First General Staff. The Navy's General Board helped bring about the force that won World War II. One of the many aspects of its wisdom was withholding judgment until after experimentation. Change was helped along by post-World War I arms reduction treaties which limited capital shipbuilding and banned overseas bases in the Pacific. This led to gradual innovation away from the battleship and toward sea-based logistics, floating dry docks, long range submarines, carrier aviation, and more. John argues that a paucity of resources created an imperative to innovate. The discussion turns to the 21st century. John argued a new arms reduction treaty would benefit the US and the world. While he doesn't think budgets should be drastically cut, he is no fan of largess. A holiday on aircraft carrier construction, for example, would force military planners to really grapple with new challenges like anti-access. I ask about whether China would agree to limitations. Listen to the whole thing to hear his contrarian -- and well-informed -- point of view. I'd like to thank John for joining me on the Acquisition Talk podcast. Check out all of his books available on Amazon. I've uploaded John's excellent 2017 report to the CNO on Fleet Design. Watch some of his lectures available on YouTube. Here is a nice paper from John's student, Innovation from the Sea, on unmanned aerial vehicle policy. He recommends that you check out a great PowerPoint presentation from Jim Corum, Development of German Army Operational Doctrine in the Interwar Period. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

Agents of Innovation with John Kuehn

Bruce Cameron

I was pleased to have Bruce Cameron on the Acquisition Talk podcast. He is the director of the System Architecture Lab at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Bruce also co-founded a consulting firm — Technology Strategy Partners — where he has worked with many of the leading firms in tech, aerospace, logistics, and consumer goods.In the episode, Bruce tells us about open architectures, how the term modular is used so broadly as to be mean almost nothing, what leads to product lock-in effects, the three lens model of organizations, whether cybersecurity has fundamentally changed anything about architecture, and much more.During the discussion, he tells us about the results of the MIT commonality study. It gives us a more positive framing of the F-35 program. Decreases in commonality from 80 to 90 percent down to 20 to 30 percent is common in joint defense programs and industry platforms. He provides four criteria for judging whether platforms of common parts will succeed.Bruce also describes two of the “big levers” that we can use to improve product developments: quality of people and risk posture of the firm/agency. Without pulling these levers, agile processes cannot be used to a great effect. He also explains whether agile can be used for new systems architecture, or whether it is limited to the development of applications.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

I was pleased to have Bruce Cameron on the Acquisition Talk podcast. He is the director of the System Architecture Lab at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Bruce also co-founded a consulting firm — Technology Strategy Partners — where he has worked with many of the leading firms in tech, aerospace, logistics, and consumer goods. In the episode, Bruce tells us about open architectures, how the term modular is used so broadly as to be mean almost nothing, what leads to product lock-in effects, the three lens model of organizations, whether cybersecurity has fundamentally changed anything about architecture, and much more. During the discussion, he tells us about the results of the MIT commonality study. It gives us a more positive framing of the F-35 program. Decreases in commonality from 80 to 90 percent down to 20 to 30 percent is common in joint defense programs and industry platforms. He provides four criteria for judging whether platforms of common parts will succeed. Bruce also describes two of the “big levers” that we can use to improve product developments: quality of people and risk posture of the firm/agency. Without pulling these levers, agile processes cannot be used to a great effect. He also explains whether agile can be used for new systems architecture, or whether it is limited to the development of applications. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

Technology strategies and architecture with Bruce Cameron

David Deptula

I was please to speak with Lt. Gen. David Deptula (ret.) on the Acquisition Talk podcast. He is currently Dean at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies and, as I learned in the episode, he was the only Air Force pilot to be mission ready to fly an F-15 all the way from Lieutenant to Lt. General. He also helped plan the air campaign in Desert Storm and was the first Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR including unmanned aircraft.The episode starts with a discussion on his study of mosaic warfare, or the concept of disaggregating functions into simpler systems which are tied together in a broader operational network. These "tiles" will work alongside multi-mission platforms already fielded, complementing their capabilities with lower-cost solutions that are attritable. David dispels myths about mosaic warfare, such as resilience problems stemming from the need to be connected all the time in a single architecture. Mosaic is about building in adaptation and resiliency.The conversation moves onto Dr. William Roper's vision for a digital century series aircraft program, reminiscent of the experimentation of several diverse fighter aircraft over the 1950s. David finds the allusion unfortunate, because he doesn't expect the Air Force to procure large batches of different aircraft. However, he agrees with the principles of incrementally prototyping several designs and continuously maturing them, even if they aren't procured. To this end, he agrees with Roper's decision to raise the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program into a Program Executive Office that can pursue multiple ends with gradual integration, and supports a mission-funded budget account.The episode also features discussions on digital engineering, why the military is the as conservative as the catholic church, design as a process of discovery, how tactical decisions centralized between Desert Storm and Afghanistan, the questions of mobilization and resourcing the strategy, and how to move us from a mindset from cost-per-widget to cost-per-desired-effect.I'd like to thank Lt. Gen David Deptula (ret.) for joining me. See more of his great work at the Mitchell Institute, including force sizing methods in The Force We Need and a great empirical paper on USAF inventory from 1950-2017, Arsenal of Airpower. He also writes relatively frequently at Breaking Defense, including an interesting piece that argues low bomber availability rates are a sign of high demand more than poor management. Here is David on the NGAD program. And here is David speaking with Vago Muridian about Nuclear C2 and F-15s. Be sure to listen to him on the Chrome 360 podcast discussing his experience in Desert Storm, highly recommended.This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at AcquisitionTalk.com.

I was please to speak with Lt. Gen. David Deptula (ret.) on the Acquisition Talk podcast. He is currently Dean at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies and, as I learned in the episode, he was the only Air Force pilot to be mission ready to fly an F-15 all the way from Lieutenant to Lt. General. He also helped plan the air campaign in Desert Storm and was the first Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR including unmanned aircraft. The episode starts with a discussion on his study of mosaic warfare, or the concept of disaggregating functions into simpler systems which are tied together in a broader operational network. These "tiles" will work alongside multi-mission platforms already fielded, complementing their capabilities with lower-cost solutions that are attritable. David dispels myths about mosaic warfare, such as resilience problems stemming from the need to be connected all the time in a single architecture. Mosaic is about building in adaptation and resiliency. The conversation moves onto Dr. William Roper's vision for a digital century series aircraft program, reminiscent of the experimentation of several diverse fighter aircraft over the 1950s. David finds the allusion unfortunate, because he doesn't expect the Air Force to procure large batches of different aircraft. However, he agrees with the principles of incrementally prototyping several designs and continuously maturing them, even if they aren't procured. To this end, he agrees with Roper's decision to raise the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program into a Program Executive Office that can pursue multiple ends with gradual integration, and supports a mission-funded budget account. The episode also features discussions on digital engineering, why the military is the as conservative as the catholic church, design as a process of discovery, how tactical decisions centralized between Desert Storm and Afghanistan, the questions of mobilization and resourcing the strategy, and how to move us from a mindset from cost-per-widget to cost-per-desired-effect. I'd like to thank Lt. Gen David Deptula (ret.) for joining me. See more of his great work at the Mitchell Institute, including force sizing methods in The Force We Need and a great empirical paper on USAF inventory from 1950-2017, Arsenal of Airpower. He also writes relatively frequently at Breaking Defense, including an interesting piece that argues low bomber availability rates are a sign of high demand more than poor management. Here is David on the NGAD program. And here is David speaking with Vago Muridian about Nuclear C2 and F-15s. Be sure to listen to him on the Chrome 360 podcast discussing his experience in Desert Storm, highly recommended. This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. Soundtrack by urmymuse: "reflections of u". You can follow us on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at <a href="http://AcquisitionTalk.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AcquisitionTalk.com</a>.

Mosaic warfare, strategy, and the digital century series with Lt. Gen. David Deptula (ret.)

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