While the question concerning the truth of determinism may be an empirical question, that is, it will be settled by the various sciences, philosophers are particularly interested in whether or not the hypothetical truth of determinism would rule out free will.  In this lecture, we look at two opposing positions on this issue: those who think that determinism is compatible with having free will (compatibilists) and those think that determinism undermines freedom (incompatibilists). Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

While the question concerning the truth of determinism may be an empirical question, that is, it will be settled by the various sciences, philosophers are particularly interested in whether or not the hypothetical truth of determinism would rule out free will. In this lecture, we look at two opposing positions on this issue: those who think that determinism is compatible with having free will (compatibilists) and those think that determinism undermines freedom (incompatibilists). Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Free Will II

If the world is causally determined, does this mean people no longer have free will? Or is being free compatible with determinism. In this lecture, I discuss two opposing positions regarding the existence of free will even though both agree that genuine free will is incompatible with determinism. On the one hand, there are hard determinists who think that because determinism is true, then this means that free will does not exist.  On the other hand, there are libertarians who think that the falsity of determinism leads to the actual existence of an agent that chooses freely.  Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

If the world is causally determined, does this mean people no longer have free will? Or is being free compatible with determinism. In this lecture, I discuss two opposing positions regarding the existence of free will even though both agree that genuine free will is incompatible with determinism. On the one hand, there are hard determinists who think that because determinism is true, then this means that free will does not exist. On the other hand, there are libertarians who think that the falsity of determinism leads to the actual existence of an agent that chooses freely. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Free Will I

Two of the most vocal critics of the idea that information processing machines may be said to think, or show intelligence, are Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle. This lecture briefly addresses some of Dreyfus' thoughts in this regard, which hinge on the contrast between know-how and knowledge-that, before turning to consider Searle's famous "Chinese Room" thought experiment and the various replies that have been made to it.  Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Two of the most vocal critics of the idea that information processing machines may be said to think, or show intelligence, are Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle. This lecture briefly addresses some of Dreyfus' thoughts in this regard, which hinge on the contrast between know-how and knowledge-that, before turning to consider Searle's famous "Chinese Room" thought experiment and the various replies that have been made to it. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Artificial Intelligence II

This lecture introduces students to the work of Alan Turing and the project of creating Artificial Intelligence that he played a significant role in inaugurating. We consider some of the objections to standard forms of AI (but not necessarily all) posed by Hubert Dreyfus in various of his books. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

This lecture introduces students to the work of Alan Turing and the project of creating Artificial Intelligence that he played a significant role in inaugurating. We consider some of the objections to standard forms of AI (but not necessarily all) posed by Hubert Dreyfus in various of his books. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Artificial Intelligence I

In this lecture we discuss two competing solutions to the mind-body problem. First, we look at the identity theory of mind, or reductive materialism, which says that the mind is identical to the brain. Then, we look at property dualism, which agrees with the materialist that there is only one type of substance but differs on the type of properties the substance can have. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

In this lecture we discuss two competing solutions to the mind-body problem. First, we look at the identity theory of mind, or reductive materialism, which says that the mind is identical to the brain. Then, we look at property dualism, which agrees with the materialist that there is only one type of substance but differs on the type of properties the substance can have. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

The Consciousness Conundrum II

The mind appears to be of a radically different nature to the everyday material items we normally encounter. Insofar as our body, including our brain, are considered parts of the material world, it becomes a mystery as to how our mind can find a place within nature and interact with out body. This is what is known as the mind-body problem. After trying to make sense of the problem, this lecture explores a proposed solution in the form of substance dualism as propounded by French philosopher Rene Descartes. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

The mind appears to be of a radically different nature to the everyday material items we normally encounter. Insofar as our body, including our brain, are considered parts of the material world, it becomes a mystery as to how our mind can find a place within nature and interact with out body. This is what is known as the mind-body problem. After trying to make sense of the problem, this lecture explores a proposed solution in the form of substance dualism as propounded by French philosopher Rene Descartes. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

The Consciousness Conundrum I

Do we know that others have minds? This lecture considers two main types of response to the “problem of other minds”: those that are inferential in nature and argue that perception of others alone is an insufficient justification, requiring either an argument by analogy, or an inference to the best explanation; those that are non-inferential in nature, advocating either direct perception of others in some core emotions, or the view that certain experiences that we do have (e.g. shame) presuppose the existence of others. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Do we know that others have minds? This lecture considers two main types of response to the “problem of other minds”: those that are inferential in nature and argue that perception of others alone is an insufficient justification, requiring either an argument by analogy, or an inference to the best explanation; those that are non-inferential in nature, advocating either direct perception of others in some core emotions, or the view that certain experiences that we do have (e.g. shame) presuppose the existence of others. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Other Minds

This lecture is a discussion of the problem of induction. I begin by looking at the structure of logical reasoning with a view to delineating the ‘problem’ with inductive reasoning; this is a problem for scientific knowledge as inductive reasoning is essential to science. I explore Hume's analysis of the problem of induction with a view to showing how deep the problem runs. I explain Hume's ultimate resolution to the problem in modern parlance as a type of naturalism. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

This lecture is a discussion of the problem of induction. I begin by looking at the structure of logical reasoning with a view to delineating the ‘problem’ with inductive reasoning; this is a problem for scientific knowledge as inductive reasoning is essential to science. I explore Hume's analysis of the problem of induction with a view to showing how deep the problem runs. I explain Hume's ultimate resolution to the problem in modern parlance as a type of naturalism. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

The Problem of Induction

This lecture continues the discussion of scepticism introduced in the preceding lecture. There is discussion of  different views about what the consequences would be for someone who accepted scepticism, and of some of the arguments that have been given for rejecting scepticism. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

This lecture continues the discussion of scepticism introduced in the preceding lecture. There is discussion of different views about what the consequences would be for someone who accepted scepticism, and of some of the arguments that have been given for rejecting scepticism. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Brain-snatched II

This lecture deals with philosophical scepticism about the physical world. This is the idea that we do not really have any evidence (at all!) for any of our ordinary beliefs about the world around us, because we cannot rule out the possibility that all our experience is  some sort of massive illusion. We look at the detail of the argument for this startling view, and at one of the responses that may be made to it. The lecture refers to Chapter 3, "Brain-Snatched", in Stephen Law's book, The Philosophy Gym. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

This lecture deals with philosophical scepticism about the physical world. This is the idea that we do not really have any evidence (at all!) for any of our ordinary beliefs about the world around us, because we cannot rule out the possibility that all our experience is some sort of massive illusion. We look at the detail of the argument for this startling view, and at one of the responses that may be made to it. The lecture refers to Chapter 3, "Brain-Snatched", in Stephen Law's book, The Philosophy Gym. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Brain-snatched I

In this subject we examine some of the central problems that have captivated philosophers throughout millennia, as well as those that scientific advances and cultural changes have only recently brought to our attention. These might include: where did the universe come from? Might a machine think? Is time travel possible? Is it morally acceptable to eat meat, or to design children genetically? Does the world suggest the existence of a designer, a God? Students will focus on examining the merits of the various arguments on these issues, dealing with each philosophical problem for a week. Students will be introduced to most of the major philosophical areas, including epistemology (what can we know?), metaphysics (what is the nature of reality?), ethics, personal identity, and philosophy of mind.

Philosophical Problems

This lecture looks at what creationism is all about and some of the arguments that proponents of creationism use to argue that it is science. I ask what it is about science that makes it ‘science’. I outline an Popper’s theory of falsification as a response to the demarcation problem and finish by looking at a possible creationist response to the issue of falsification. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

This lecture looks at what creationism is all about and some of the arguments that proponents of creationism use to argue that it is science. I ask what it is about science that makes it ‘science’. I outline an Popper’s theory of falsification as a response to the demarcation problem and finish by looking at a possible creationist response to the issue of falsification. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Creationism and Science

This lecture builds a more sophisticated response to the demarcation problem (over and above Popper’s response) that includes ideas from Kuhn, Lakatos and Thagard. I outline some of the weakest points in the creationists’ arguments and conclude by mentioning a couple of recent points of interest in the debate. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

This lecture builds a more sophisticated response to the demarcation problem (over and above Popper’s response) that includes ideas from Kuhn, Lakatos and Thagard. I outline some of the weakest points in the creationists’ arguments and conclude by mentioning a couple of recent points of interest in the debate. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Creationism and Science II

Philosophy Essay Writing

Does it make sense to think we can duplicate persons, so that people can divide just like cells?   Since splitting means dividing one person into two people, the obvious answer seems to be that persons are unable to undergo fission.  By looking at the old example of the Ship of Theseus we find that it is possible to think of artefacts dividing, in that one ship can become two.  More precisely, a set of time-slices that constitute one ship can be shared by two different future sets of time slices that  constitute two different ships.  Exactly the same can be said of person fission of the sort that could happen using Star-Trek-style teleporter technology. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Does it make sense to think we can duplicate persons, so that people can divide just like cells? Since splitting means dividing one person into two people, the obvious answer seems to be that persons are unable to undergo fission. By looking at the old example of the Ship of Theseus we find that it is possible to think of artefacts dividing, in that one ship can become two. More precisely, a set of time-slices that constitute one ship can be shared by two different future sets of time slices that constitute two different ships. Exactly the same can be said of person fission of the sort that could happen using Star-Trek-style teleporter technology. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Self Identity, Part II

What makes me the person I am?  Two popular answers are that my identity depends on the continuing existence of my body, or that my identity depends on some psychological continuity, such as the functioning and extent of memory.  The seventeenth-century English philosopher, John Locke, argued that conditions of identity are relative to the kind or sort of thing we are thinking about.  Living things are not just masses of matter but organized assemblages of parts that support growth, nutrition and sometimes self-repair.  We explain why Locke thought that A could be the same human being as B, but not the same person, and discuss Locke's idea that memory can be an adequate condition for personal identity. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

What makes me the person I am? Two popular answers are that my identity depends on the continuing existence of my body, or that my identity depends on some psychological continuity, such as the functioning and extent of memory. The seventeenth-century English philosopher, John Locke, argued that conditions of identity are relative to the kind or sort of thing we are thinking about. Living things are not just masses of matter but organized assemblages of parts that support growth, nutrition and sometimes self-repair. We explain why Locke thought that A could be the same human being as B, but not the same person, and discuss Locke's idea that memory can be an adequate condition for personal identity. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

Self Identity, Part I

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