This is the fifth episode in our Kokoda Track series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion.  The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men.  Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle-hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.  This episode looks at the fall of Isurava.  Japanese troops in increasing numbers, with increasing persistence and increasing ferocity forced Australian troops to withdraw.  Australian efforts to retake Kokoda will need to wait for another day. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is the fifth episode in our <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/category/kokoda/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Kokoda Track</a> series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion.  The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men.  Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle-hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.  This episode looks at the fall of Isurava.  Japanese troops in increasing numbers, with increasing persistence and increasing ferocity forced Australian troops to withdraw.  Australian efforts to retake Kokoda will need to wait for another day. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

100 - The fall of Isurava

This is the fourth episode in our Kokoda Track series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion.  The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men.  Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.  This episode looks at the events on the 27th of August, 1942.  We discuss how the CO, LT COL Kenneth Ward was killed and the impact it had on the 53rd Battalion and Maroubra Force as they fought desperately to defend Isurava. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is the fourth episode in our <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/category/kokoda/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Kokoda Track</a> series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion.  The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men.  Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.  This episode looks at the events on the 27th of August, 1942.  We discuss how the CO, LT COL Kenneth Ward was killed and the impact it had on the 53rd Battalion and Maroubra Force as they fought desperately to defend Isurava. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

99 - The Death of a CO

Jim Storr

 This is part 2 of our interview with Dr Jim Storr, the author of Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century. We discuss the correct size for a Headquarters. We discuss the selection and training of officers within the Wehrmacht. How do we affect cultural and doctrinal change within Armies to support the effective use of Mission Command? Jim Storr was an infantry officer in the British Army for 25 years.  He served in the British Army of the Rhine for five years in the 1980s.  A graduate of the Army Staff College, Camberley, he also worked in the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, and wrote high-level doctrine. He was a professor of war studies at the Norwegian Military Academy for four years.  His published works include ‘The Human Face of War’, ‘The Hall of Mirrors’ and 'Something Rotten'. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is part 2 of our interview with Dr Jim Storr, the author of Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century. We discuss the correct size for a Headquarters. We discuss the selection and training of officers within the Wehrmacht. How do we affect cultural and doctrinal change within Armies to support the effective use of Mission Command? Jim Storr was an infantry officer in the British Army for 25 years.  He served in the British Army of the Rhine for five years in the 1980s.  A graduate of the Army Staff College, Camberley, he also worked in the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, and wrote high-level doctrine. He was a professor of war studies at the Norwegian Military Academy for four years.  His published works include ‘The Human Face of War’, ‘The Hall of Mirrors’ and 'Something Rotten'. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

98 - Creating the doctrinal and cultural changes for effective Mission Command with Jim Storr

This episode is with Dr Jim Storr, the author of Something Rotten. Preparing a set of orders is a core function of a Headquarters.  Why have today's procedures changed from the what was done in WW2, what have we learnt and are modern HQs fit for purpose? We discuss the form and functioning of Headquarters, looking at people, processes, products and purpose, comparing WW2 doctrine with what is happening today. Jim Storr was an infantry officer in the British Army for 25 years.  He served in the British Army of the Rhine for five years in the 1980s.  A graduate of the Army Staff College, Camberley, he also worked in the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, and wrote high-level doctrine. He was a professor of war studies at the Norwegian Military Academy for four years.  His published works include ‘The Human Face of War’, ‘The Hall of Mirrors’ and 'Something Rotten'. Check out the   show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This episode is with Dr Jim Storr, the author of Something Rotten. Preparing a set of orders is a core function of a Headquarters.  Why have today's procedures changed from the what was done in WW2, what have we learnt and are modern HQs fit for purpose? We discuss the form and functioning of Headquarters, looking at people, processes, products and purpose, comparing WW2 doctrine with what is happening today. Jim Storr was an infantry officer in the British Army for 25 years.  He served in the British Army of the Rhine for five years in the 1980s.  A graduate of the Army Staff College, Camberley, he also worked in the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, and wrote high-level doctrine. He was a professor of war studies at the Norwegian Military Academy for four years.  His published works include ‘The Human Face of War’, ‘The Hall of Mirrors’ and 'Something Rotten'. Check out the  <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

97 - Time and the importance of timeliness in orders with Jim Storr

This is the third  episode in our Kokoda Track series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion.  The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men.  Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.  This episode continues to story of the 53rd Battalion as they start patrolling the jungle around Isurava. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is the third  episode in our <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/category/kokoda/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Kokoda Track</a> series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion.  The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men.  Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.  This episode continues to story of the 53rd Battalion as they start patrolling the jungle around Isurava. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

96 - The 53rd Battalion at Isurava during the Kokoda Campaign

This is the second episode in our Kokoda Track series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion.  The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men.  Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.  This episodes looks at just 4 weeks in the history of the Battalion, from when the started up the track, during their contact with the Japanese and through till the time the were order to leave the battlefield.  There is much to learn from their experience. We look for lessons in training, leadership, strategic surprise and mobilisation from the 53rd on the Kokoda Trail. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is the second episode in our <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/category/kokoda/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Kokoda Track</a> series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion.  The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men.  Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.  This episodes looks at just 4 weeks in the history of the Battalion, from when the started up the track, during their contact with the Japanese and through till the time the were order to leave the battlefield.  There is much to learn from their experience. We look for lessons in training, leadership, strategic surprise and mobilisation from the 53rd on the Kokoda Trail. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

95 - A militia Battalion on the Kokoda Trail

This episodes starts a new series looking at the Kokoda Track at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.  This series will look for lessons from the experience of the 53rd Battalion.  The 53rd is a sister Battalion to the 49th and the excellent 39th Battalions.  There is a marked difference between the 39th and 53rd.  Despite incredible bravery, the 53rd struggled to achieve some of that tasks assigned to it (through no fault of their own.)  Indeed, many of the men went on to fight bravely in the 55th/53rd and 39th Battalion after the 53rd was disbanded. We look for lessons in training, leadership, strategic surprise and mobilisation from the 53rd on the Kokoda Trail. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This episodes starts a new series looking at the Kokoda Track at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.  This series will look for lessons from the experience of the 53rd Battalion.  The 53rd is a sister Battalion to the 49th and the excellent 39th Battalions.  There is a marked difference between the 39th and 53rd.  Despite incredible bravery, the 53rd struggled to achieve some of that tasks assigned to it (through no fault of their own.)  Indeed, many of the men went on to fight bravely in the 55th/53rd and 39th Battalion after the 53rd was disbanded. We look for lessons in training, leadership, strategic surprise and mobilisation from the 53rd on the Kokoda Trail. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

94 - The 53rd Battalion on the Kokoda Trail

This episodes looks at PLA doctrine in 1950 and how it was used to surprise the UN forces on the Yalu River as well as looking at how deception is employed in contemporary PLA doctrine. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This episodes looks at PLA doctrine in 1950 and how it was used to surprise the UN forces on the Yalu River as well as looking at how deception is employed in contemporary PLA doctrine. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

93 - Chinese Deception Planning on the Yalu River, 1950

Stunning intelligence failures, rigidity of mind and excellent Chinese tactical camouflage led to a stunning reversal of fortunes for the UN forces in late 1950 on the Yalu River?  What deception measures did the Chinese use? How did MacArthur contribute to the surprise?  A fascinating look at Chinese military deception and American intelligence failings. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

Stunning intelligence failures, rigidity of mind and excellent Chinese tactical camouflage led to a stunning reversal of fortunes for the UN forces in late 1950 on the Yalu River? <ul> <li>What deception measures did the Chinese use?</li> <li>How did MacArthur contribute to the surprise?</li> </ul> A fascinating look at Chinese military deception and American intelligence failings. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

92 - Deception and self deception on the Yalu River - 1950

This episode looks at the the principles of employment for artillery 2nd Alamein and is part of our  Battles of Alamein series. We discuss  Why the German artillery performed so poorly. How Montgomery's use of artillery replicated the principles of war today; and How integration was achieved with the manvoeuvre plan  Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This episode looks at the the principles of employment for artillery 2nd Alamein and is part of our <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/category/the-battles-of-el-alamein/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> Battles of Alamein</a> series. We discuss <ul> <li>Why the German artillery performed so poorly.</li> <li>How Montgomery's use of artillery replicated the principles of war today; and</li> <li>How integration was achieved with the manvoeuvre plan</li> </ul> Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

91 - Principles for Employment of Artillery at 2nd Alamein

Learn the lessons of military history by looking at the great battles through the lens of the Principles of War.  Part of the enduring nature of war, all good Generals follow the 10 Principles of War.  The great Generals of history have the ability to know which of the principles are most important at the decisive moments of the campaign.We study the great battles to draw the lessons on strategy, tactics and leadership.

Very interesting, it’s not professional but still great. Lots of information on strategys.

Great!

Not a professional

Learn the lessons of military history by looking at the great battles through the lens of the Principles of War. Part of the enduring nature of war, all good Generals follow the 10 Principles of War. The great Generals of history have the ability to know which of the principles are most important at the decisive moments of the campaign. We study the great battles to draw the lessons on strategy, tactics and leadership.

The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics and Leadership.

We conduct Mission Analysis in order to determine the desired endstate for the deployment of 1 ATF to Nui Dat and the orders for D/6 as they patrolled out to Long Tan. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We conduct Mission Analysis in order to determine the desired endstate for the deployment of 1 ATF to Nui Dat and the orders for D/6 as they patrolled out to Long Tan. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a> If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

40 - Long Tan Mission Analysis

This podcast looks at the contribution of Soviet women to the military in the Great Patriotic War. Based on the The Unwomanly Face of War, by Svetlana Alexievich which received a Nobel Prize for Literature.  We discuss:  Women in the Air Transport Auxiliary Mary Ellis, the ferry pilot with over 1,000 missions Natalya Meklen, one of the Nacht Hexen with over 800 combat missions in a Po 2.   What does the female contribution to Total War mean for a moral centre of gravity.  Check out the show notes for more details on the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.  Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.  If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This podcast looks at the contribution of Soviet women to the military in the Great Patriotic War. Based on the The Unwomanly Face of War, by Svetlana Alexievich which received a Nobel Prize for Literature.  We discuss: <ul> <li>Women in the Air Transport Auxiliary</li> <li>Mary Ellis, the ferry pilot with over 1,000 missions</li> <li>Natalya Meklen, one of the Nacht Hexen with over 800 combat missions in a Po 2. </li> </ul> What does the female contribution to Total War mean for a moral centre of gravity. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for more details on the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a> If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

38 - The experience of women in the Soviet Military in WW2.

Our guest on the podast today is BRIG Ulf Henricsson from the Swedish Army.  He was the commander of Nordbat 2, which was recognised as one of the most successful units that where committed to UNPROFOR for the peacekeeing effort in Bosnia.  I first read about Nordbat 2 in an Article on  Strategy Bridge. We start with the discussion about how Mission Command has been used in the Swedish Army, and how it is taught within the Swedish Army, including the way that Mission Command is used in barracks.  We discuss the composition of Nordbat 2.  The composition is the start of the success of Nordbat 2 and the composition was driven by the Mision Analysis that was conducted. Of the 1,300 members of Nordbat 2, around 1,000 were reservists who had volunteered for service in Bosnia.  The Mission is a critical part of Mission Command, including the intent, so we look at explicit and implied tasks in the mission that was given.  He found that within Bosnia, the discussion about the mission was a lot easier than the discussions between countries. This leads to a discussion about the Rules of Engagement and how they were used.  BRIG Henricsson has a relatively free interpretation of the rules of engagement with that interpretation devolved down the chain of command. We discuss some of the examples of Mission Command that lead to the success of Nordbat 2, including the incident at Stupni Do.   The use of Mission Command and robust peacekeeping lead to a reputation that assisted Nordbat 2 in the accomplishment of their mission. We look at Mission Analysis and how it lead to a composition for Nordbat 2 that set some of the conditions for success.  Another component was the rules of engagement that were provided by nations providing troops to UNPROFOR.  The RoE and the interpretation of the RoE was often manipulated by warring forces and lead to some units being ineffective in their role. BRIG Henriccson discusses support he received from his Commander in Bosnia, and he also discusses the risks that he ran with the use of Mission Command.  We finish with a look at some of the reasons that Mission Command is difficult to practice and what some of the conditions are required for the successful use of Mission Command. He finishes off with his advice for commanders today on how to use Mission Command to enhance your chances of mission success. Some questions that are raised are: Are some societies better placed to enact Mission Command? How often is there a clear intent in orders that you receive? Is their a difference between the employment of Mission Command in barracks vs on Operation or Exercise?

Our guest on the podast today is BRIG Ulf Henricsson from the Swedish Army.  He was the commander of Nordbat 2, which was recognised as one of the most successful units that where committed to UNPROFOR for the peacekeeing effort in Bosnia.  I first read about Nordbat 2 in an Article on <a href="https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/9/20/trigger-happy-autonomous-and-disobedient-nordbat-2-and-mission-command-in-bosnia" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> Strategy Bridge</a>. We start with the discussion about how Mission Command has been used in the Swedish Army, and how it is taught within the Swedish Army, including the way that Mission Command is used in barracks.  We discuss the composition of Nordbat 2.  The composition is the start of the success of Nordbat 2 and the composition was driven by the Mision Analysis that was conducted. Of the 1,300 members of Nordbat 2, around 1,000 were reservists who had volunteered for service in Bosnia.  The Mission is a critical part of Mission Command, including the intent, so we look at explicit and implied tasks in the mission that was given.  He found that within Bosnia, the discussion about the mission was a lot easier than the discussions between countries. This leads to a discussion about the Rules of Engagement and how they were used.  BRIG Henricsson has a relatively free interpretation of the rules of engagement with that interpretation devolved down the chain of command. We discuss some of the examples of Mission Command that lead to the success of Nordbat 2, including the incident at Stupni Do.   The use of Mission Command and robust peacekeeping lead to a reputation that assisted Nordbat 2 in the accomplishment of their mission. We look at Mission Analysis and how it lead to a composition for Nordbat 2 that set some of the conditions for success.  Another component was the rules of engagement that were provided by nations providing troops to UNPROFOR.  The RoE and the interpretation of the RoE was often manipulated by warring forces and lead to some units being ineffective in their role. BRIG Henriccson discusses support he received from his Commander in Bosnia, and he also discusses the risks that he ran with the use of Mission Command.  We finish with a look at some of the reasons that Mission Command is difficult to practice and what some of the conditions are required for the successful use of Mission Command. He finishes off with his advice for commanders today on how to use Mission Command to enhance your chances of mission success. Some questions that are raised are: Are some societies better placed to enact Mission Command? How often is there a clear intent in orders that you receive? Is their a difference between the employment of Mission Command in barracks vs on Operation or Exercise?

32 - Mission Command and Mission Success with Nordbat 2

The Centre of Gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight.  For the British, the CoG was the Singapore Naval Base.  It was the fundamental part of the defence of the whole of South East Asia.  In times of need the Royal Navy would sail out to Singapore and defeat all comers and ensure that the Empire was secure.  The port at Singapore was central to the defence of Australia.  The base wasn't big enough for the fleet required to keep the seas free.  The fleet was unlikely to sally forth if decisively engaged in Europe, so the fleet base was too small for a fleet that was unlikely ever sail there.  It turned out to be the second largest graving dock in the world at the time. We look at how the Singapore Strategy became increasingly untenable, but no one was prepared to In 1940 it became apparent that the Navy would not be able to sail to Singapore 'for the foreseeable future." LT GEN Percival conducted an analysis of the defence of Singapore before the war.  This dictated that the defence of Singapore would need to be conducted in Malaya and northern Malaya at that. As the war progressed, Churchill hoped that the US would provide the Navy required to support the British in the Far East, if provoked. With no Navy to defend the base, the defence of Malaya fell to the Air Force.  With not enough planes and the planes they had being too old, the last line of defence would be the Army. The defence of the base dictated the way that the Battle of Malaya was fought. For the Japanese, the CoG analysis is a lot easier.  It was the tank. The tanks the Japanese had were not great and the tactics they used were not modern, but they had tanks, used them very aggressively and the British had no tanks in Malaya.  The Japanese used the tanks for filleting attacks which were devastating, especially against forces that were not well versed in combined arms, or even anti tank weapons. A Critical Vulnerability of tanks, of course, is the logistics tail required.  How will Yamashita overcome this?

The Centre of Gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight.  For the British, the CoG was the Singapore Naval Base.  It was the fundamental part of the defence of the whole of South East Asia.  In times of need the Royal Navy would sail out to Singapore and defeat all comers and ensure that the Empire was secure.  The port at Singapore was central to the defence of Australia.  The base wasn't big enough for the fleet required to keep the seas free.  The fleet was unlikely to sally forth if decisively engaged in Europe, so the fleet base was too small for a fleet that was unlikely ever sail there.  It turned out to be the second largest graving dock in the world at the time. We look at how the Singapore Strategy became increasingly untenable, but no one was prepared to In 1940 it became apparent that the Navy would not be able to sail to Singapore 'for the foreseeable future." LT GEN Percival conducted an analysis of the defence of Singapore before the war.  This dictated that the defence of Singapore would need to be conducted in Malaya and northern Malaya at that. As the war progressed, Churchill hoped that the US would provide the Navy required to support the British in the Far East, if provoked. With no Navy to defend the base, the defence of Malaya fell to the Air Force.  With not enough planes and the planes they had being too old, the last line of defence would be the Army. The defence of the base dictated the way that the Battle of Malaya was fought. For the Japanese, the CoG analysis is a lot easier.  It was the tank. The tanks the Japanese had were not great and the tactics they used were not modern, but they had tanks, used them very aggressively and the British had no tanks in Malaya.  The Japanese used the tanks for filleting attacks which were devastating, especially against forces that were not well versed in combined arms, or even anti tank weapons. A Critical Vulnerability of tanks, of course, is the logistics tail required.  How will Yamashita overcome this?

2 - The Japanese and Allied Centres of Gravity for the Malaya Campaign

Whilst everyone agrees that determining the Center of Gravity is really important, but there is not a lot of information on the actual process to do that. We look at the inside out methodology by Rueschoff and Dunne as a way of determining the CoG.  This methodology starts with objective, then looks at the critical capabilities that allow the achievement of the objective. We pause to look at the role that time in CoG analysis.  The CoG can change over time. War on the Rocks had a  great article on the procurement of oil in the Pacific and how a limited assessment of future critical factors can lead to issues.  Who is doing a future Critical Factor analysis?  What role does this have in planning? We then look at the Eikmeier methodology.  This is based on Ends, Ways and Means.  The Eikmeier methodology provides a user friendly cut down version of systems theory.  Identify the desired endstate. ID the ways that it can be achieved. (CCs) List the means required to enable the CC. Select the entity that can achieve the means that can achieve the endstate.  This is the CoG. Select critical items from the means on the list. ID the critical requirements that are vulnerable.  We look at an example of Madonna deciding to be elected as President of the US.  With that Endstate, we look at the ways she could achieve this and the means that she would need to be POTUS. We look at the validity test to ensure that you have the right entity as being the CoG. We look at the CoG example for Hannibal at Cannae.  Have a listen to  Dan Carlin's Punic Nightmare to get a great idea of what the fighting was like at Cannae.  We look at the Roman Army that faces Cannae and how he can defeat it.  We look at how Hannibal structured his battle to attack the critical vulnerabilities of the Roman Army. Hannibal was begged to march on Rome, but he only sent a delegation to Rome to discuss surrender.  One hundred and fifty thousand males had died fighting Hannibal over 3 crippling losses.  What happened after Cannae?  How did the Roman moral Center of Gravity impact Hannibal?  Hannibal has destroyed 3 operational level centers of gravity, yet he did not destroy the Roman moral centre of gravity.

Whilst everyone agrees that determining the Center of Gravity is really important, but there is not a lot of information on the actual process to do that. We look at the inside out methodology by Rueschoff and Dunne as a way of determining the CoG.  This methodology starts with objective, then looks at the critical capabilities that allow the achievement of the objective. We pause to look at the role that time in CoG analysis.  The CoG can change over time. War on the Rocks had a <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/the-shell-game-fueling-a-future-war-in-the-pacific/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> great article</a> on the procurement of oil in the Pacific and how a limited assessment of future critical factors can lead to issues.  Who is doing a future Critical Factor analysis?  What role does this have in planning? We then look at the Eikmeier methodology.  This is based on Ends, Ways and Means.  The Eikmeier methodology provides a user friendly cut down version of systems theory. <ol> <li>Identify the desired endstate.</li> <li>ID the ways that it can be achieved. (CCs)</li> <li>List the means required to enable the CC.</li> <li>Select the entity that can achieve the means that can achieve the endstate.  This is the CoG.</li> <li>Select critical items from the means on the list.</li> <li>ID the critical requirements that are vulnerable.</li> </ol> We look at an example of Madonna deciding to be elected as President of the US.  With that Endstate, we look at the ways she could achieve this and the means that she would need to be POTUS. We look at the validity test to ensure that you have the right entity as being the CoG. We look at the CoG example for Hannibal at Cannae.  Have a listen to <a href="https://www.dancarlin.com/product/hardcore-history-punic-nightmares-series/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> Dan Carlin's Punic Nightmare</a> to get a great idea of what the fighting was like at Cannae.  We look at the Roman Army that faces Cannae and how he can defeat it.  We look at how Hannibal structured his battle to attack the critical vulnerabilities of the Roman Army. Hannibal was begged to march on Rome, but he only sent a delegation to Rome to discuss surrender.  One hundred and fifty thousand males had died fighting Hannibal over 3 crippling losses.  What happened after Cannae?  How did the Roman moral Center of Gravity impact Hannibal?  Hannibal has destroyed 3 operational level centers of gravity, yet he did not destroy the Roman moral centre of gravity.

20 Hannibal at the gates of Rome - The process for finding a Center of Gravity

In a surprise move, we look 2,200 years to look at the Battle of Cannae, a defeat so severe that it is said that every mother in Rome mourned the death of a son.  How could such a crushing defeat of a Roman Army. In 1992 the Center of Gravity construct was introduced into LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare and it has been confusing people ever since. What is it?  How to build one to give you a list of targetable critical vulnerabilities that you can use to achieve your desired endstate. Cannae was a double envelopment at Cannae, and has been replicated on numerous times since then. We look at the Battle of the Trebia and also the Battle of Lake Trasimene.  How did Rome respond to these crushing defeats? How did Fabius functionally dislocate the Carthaginian Army's cavalry? What is the difference between the tactical, operational, and strategic level?  What is above the military strategic level of war? How did Grand Strategy impact on the Fabien tactics that the Roman Army was using? How did Varro and Paulus manage the Army after taking control from Fabius? Hannibal has 50,000 troops, but he is faced by a Roman army 86,400. The size of the Roman Army to Gisgo was astonishing. When it comes to unity of Command, how does having 2 consuls in command of the Roman army work? The center of gravity is the key characteristic, capability or locality from which a force derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight.  What was the CoG that Hannibal was targeting at Cannae?  Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.  Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.  If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

In a surprise move, we look 2,200 years to look at the Battle of Cannae, a defeat so severe that it is said that every mother in Rome mourned the death of a son.  How could such a crushing defeat of a Roman Army. In 1992 the Center of Gravity construct was introduced into LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare and it has been confusing people ever since. What is it?  How to build one to give you a list of targetable critical vulnerabilities that you can use to achieve your desired endstate. Cannae was a double envelopment at Cannae, and has been replicated on numerous times since then. We look at the Battle of the Trebia and also the Battle of Lake Trasimene.  How did Rome respond to these crushing defeats? How did Fabius functionally dislocate the Carthaginian Army's cavalry? What is the difference between the tactical, operational, and strategic level?  What is above the military strategic level of war? How did Grand Strategy impact on the Fabien tactics that the Roman Army was using? How did Varro and Paulus manage the Army after taking control from Fabius? Hannibal has 50,000 troops, but he is faced by a Roman army 86,400. The size of the Roman Army to Gisgo was astonishing. When it comes to unity of Command, how does having 2 consuls in command of the Roman army work? The center of gravity is the key characteristic, capability or locality from which a force derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight.  What was the CoG that Hannibal was targeting at Cannae? Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a> If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

18 - The Center of Gravity at the Battle of Cannae

This is the fourth part of our  Battle of the Bismarck Sea Podcast series. This episode discusses how GEN Kenney fostered a culture of military innovation in the Fifth Air Force. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.

This is the fourth part of our <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/46-the-battle-of-the-bismarck-sea/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> Battle of the Bismarck Sea Podcast</a> series. This episode discusses how GEN Kenney fostered a culture of military innovation in the Fifth Air Force. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a>

49 - Innovative tactics for the Battle of the Bismarck Sea

For an information operation that is fought of Facebook, how do you identify the Avenues of Approach? We use OCOKA to conduct the terrain analysis for Information Analysis.  We look to orientate everyone to the human terrain in an information operation that is conducted using social media. Observation and Fields of Fire:  Observation is no longer blocked by terrain nor limited by range.  The Internet Research Agency is located in Russia, but they are able to conduct operations as if they were based in Washington DC.  Tools like Twitterfall.  We look at spearfishing email attacks.  Facebook has tools inbuilt to enable adjusting the fall of shot for each of the posts that you are using.  Cover and Concealment:  In a Social Media war, cover comes from the privacy settings.  Cover is asymmetric in a Social Media war.  We compare Op Tidal Wave 2, a conventional propaganda campaign with leaflet drops, compared to how it could be conducted with Social Media. Obstacles:  We look at culture and language – grammar in particular.  These are the real barriers for operations conducted on Social Media.    Key and Decisive Terrain:  The concept of key terrain is fundamentally changed when operations move onto social media.  We compare the 228 massacre in Taiwan and the Key Terrain there with disintermediation that social media creates. Avenues of Approach:  Traditionally the enemy is canalised into an engagement area, before they can reach their objective.  Social Media war can strike directly at civilians in a target country.  There is no physical terrain to defend.  The avenues of approach now depend on the target demographic – Linkedin, vKontact, Facebook or Snapchat.  We briefly discuss the evolution of avenues of approach for information operations.  This concludes the ground brief for social media operations.  Are there any questions? Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

For an information operation that is fought of Facebook, how do you identify the Avenues of Approach? We use OCOKA to conduct the terrain analysis for Information Analysis.  We look to orientate everyone to the human terrain in an information operation that is conducted using social media. Observation and Fields of Fire:  Observation is no longer blocked by terrain nor limited by range.  The Internet Research Agency is located in Russia, but they are able to conduct operations as if they were based in Washington DC.  Tools like Twitterfall.  We look at spearfishing email attacks.  Facebook has tools inbuilt to enable adjusting the fall of shot for each of the posts that you are using.  Cover and Concealment:  In a Social Media war, cover comes from the privacy settings.  Cover is asymmetric in a Social Media war.  We compare Op Tidal Wave 2, a conventional propaganda campaign with leaflet drops, compared to how it could be conducted with Social Media. Obstacles:  We look at culture and language – grammar in particular.  These are the real barriers for operations conducted on Social Media.    Key and Decisive Terrain:  The concept of key terrain is fundamentally changed when operations move onto social media.  We compare the 228 massacre in Taiwan and the Key Terrain there with disintermediation that social media creates. Avenues of Approach:  Traditionally the enemy is canalised into an engagement area, before they can reach their objective.  Social Media war can strike directly at civilians in a target country.  There is no physical terrain to defend.  The avenues of approach now depend on the target demographic – Linkedin, vKontact, Facebook or Snapchat.  We briefly discuss the evolution of avenues of approach for information operations.  This concludes the ground brief for social media operations.  Are there any questions? Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a> If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

30 - Terrain Analysis for a Social Media War

Why was the 5th Air Force different in the way that it innovated tactically, mechanically and organisationally? We look at how GEN Kenney lead the 5th Air Force and prepared it for the Battle of the Bismarck sea.  What was it that marked it out as one of the most innovative Air Forces in the Second World War? Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Why was the 5th Air Force different in the way that it innovated tactically, mechanically and organisationally? We look at how GEN Kenney lead the 5th Air Force and prepared it for the Battle of the Bismarck sea.  What was it that marked it out as one of the most innovative Air Forces in the Second World War? Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a> If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

47 - Military Innovation and Creativity with GEN Kenney and the Battle of the Bismarck Sea

We start our look at the Battle of Long Tan, which occured on the 18th August 1966, 4km east of the Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat.  Outnumber 20:1, the Australians took 18 KIA and 24 WIA in one of the most important and most famous battles of the whole Australian involvement in Long Tan. Our guide through Australian Military's History most famous rubber plantation is Dave Sabben.  Dave was the Platoon Commander of 12 Platoon, Delta Company on that day at Long Tan.  Conscription has been used by many countries through history as they rapidly increase the size of their defence forces in response to changing strategic circumstances, circumstances that have changed quickly and require a faster response than could be achieved with the full time Defence Force. How did the Australian Defence Force mobilised for operations in Vietnam?  We look at conscription and the history of professional armies. We start by looking at some of the components of a professional army and what the role of conscription is within the concept of National readiness.  Professional armies are very expensive to maintain and so we look at 2 components of readiness that are used to decrease the cost of having a large standing force.  How was conscription for Vietnam different to conscription in Australia during World War 2? Dave starts by talking us through the conscription process and his initial training at Kapooka.  We look at the reason for the conscription in the 1960's. Dave discusses what the aim of the training program was and the skills that officers were to receive at Scheyville.  How was the training program designed and how were leadership skills developed at OTU Scheyville?    Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.  Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.  If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We start our look at the Battle of Long Tan, which occured on the 18th August 1966, 4km east of the Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat.  Outnumber 20:1, the Australians took 18 KIA and 24 WIA in one of the most important and most famous battles of the whole Australian involvement in Long Tan. Our guide through Australian Military's History most famous rubber plantation is Dave Sabben.  Dave was the Platoon Commander of 12 Platoon, Delta Company on that day at Long Tan.  Conscription has been used by many countries through history as they rapidly increase the size of their defence forces in response to changing strategic circumstances, circumstances that have changed quickly and require a faster response than could be achieved with the full time Defence Force. How did the Australian Defence Force mobilised for operations in Vietnam?  We look at conscription and the history of professional armies. We start by looking at some of the components of a professional army and what the role of conscription is within the concept of National readiness.  Professional armies are very expensive to maintain and so we look at 2 components of readiness that are used to decrease the cost of having a large standing force.  How was conscription for Vietnam different to conscription in Australia during World War 2? Dave starts by talking us through the conscription process and his initial training at Kapooka.  We look at the reason for the conscription in the 1960's. Dave discusses what the aim of the training program was and the skills that officers were to receive at Scheyville.  How was the training program designed and how were leadership skills developed at OTU Scheyville? Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a> If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

23 - Long Tan 1: Readiness, Conscription and the Nashos

We look at the crucial at what was probably the most important 15 minutes in the entire New Guinea campaign - the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We look at the crucial at what was probably the most important 15 minutes in the entire New Guinea campaign - the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a> If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

46 - The Battle of the Bismarck Sea

Allied Doctrine had seen little development between the war with significant budget cuts.  The Army was relegated to an Imperial policing role.  It is very Command and Control way of We look at Sir John Dill and his visit to Tannenburg and his interpretation of 'Mission Command'.  Malaya was a very laissez-faire, with some units preferring not to train in the jungle. LT COL Ian Stewart from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.  He trained one of the best battalions in Malaya.  How was his training methodologies viewed at Malaya Command? British Staff College focused on strategy, not on Brigade and Division Command, which meant that British officers struggled when commanding one up. How did the 8th Division transition from the training for desert fighting once they landed in Malaya? What was the thinking about Combined Arms and how was it trained for? How did MAG GEN Gordon Bennett train the Division for the withdrawal and what where his thoughts on digging in? How did the personalities of the individual Battalion Commanders impact each of their battalions. The Japanese developed a Jungle Warfare in Taiwan to develop doctrine.  They also conducted 10 major exercises for amphibious operations. The reliance on the bicycle enabled rapid movements of troops with very little logistics impact. The difference between the Japanese and British highlighted the amount of recent modern warfare experience that each Army had been subjected to. How did the road impact the thinking for each of the commanders?  How would it shape their actions and dispositions. What is fighting for the road off the road and how did the British and Indian troops respond to this tactic? How did the Japanese task organise for their upcoming offensive? 8th Division started from the ground up to develop their doctrine, which meant that there was still significant work to be done after first contact with the enemy.

Allied Doctrine had seen little development between the war with significant budget cuts.  The Army was relegated to an Imperial policing role.  It is very Command and Control way of We look at Sir John Dill and his visit to Tannenburg and his interpretation of 'Mission Command'.  Malaya was a very laissez-faire, with some units preferring not to train in the jungle. LT COL Ian Stewart from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.  He trained one of the best battalions in Malaya.  How was his training methodologies viewed at Malaya Command? British Staff College focused on strategy, not on Brigade and Division Command, which meant that British officers struggled when commanding one up. How did the 8th Division transition from the training for desert fighting once they landed in Malaya? What was the thinking about Combined Arms and how was it trained for? How did MAG GEN Gordon Bennett train the Division for the withdrawal and what where his thoughts on digging in? How did the personalities of the individual Battalion Commanders impact each of their battalions. The Japanese developed a Jungle Warfare in Taiwan to develop doctrine.  They also conducted 10 major exercises for amphibious operations. The reliance on the bicycle enabled rapid movements of troops with very little logistics impact. The difference between the Japanese and British highlighted the amount of recent modern warfare experience that each Army had been subjected to. How did the road impact the thinking for each of the commanders?  How would it shape their actions and dispositions. What is fighting for the road off the road and how did the British and Indian troops respond to this tactic? How did the Japanese task organise for their upcoming offensive? 8th Division started from the ground up to develop their doctrine, which meant that there was still significant work to be done after first contact with the enemy.

4 - Comparing Japanese and British Doctrine in Malaya

Front

This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.  The MC for this panel discussion is BRIG John Cox RAA (retd). Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This presentation, part of the <a href="http://artilleryhistory.org/history_seminar_series/history_seminar_series_2015-2018.html" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's </a>Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.  The MC for this panel discussion is BRIG John Cox RAA (retd). Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a> If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Firepower 27: Plenary Session for the Western Front - Verdun and the end of the beginning

This lecture by LT COL David Brooks is presented by BRIG John Cox. We look at the changes in the technology and the industrial base as Britain and Australia moved to an industrial war footing for the production and development of artillery ammunition.  Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.  Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.  If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This lecture by LT COL David Brooks is presented by BRIG John Cox. We look at the changes in the technology and the industrial base as Britain and Australia moved to an industrial war footing for the production and development of artillery ammunition. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a> If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Firepower 14: New technology: Munitions, fuses and production for Artillery in WW1

This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.  This session is presented by Professor Michael Evans. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.

This presentation, part of the <a href="http://artilleryhistory.org/history_seminar_series/history_seminar_series_2015-2018.html" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's </a>Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.  This session is presented by Professor Michael Evans. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a>

Firepower 36: The emergence of modern combined arms warfare

This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.  This session is presented by Dr Roger Lee. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.

This presentation, part of the <a href="http://artilleryhistory.org/history_seminar_series/history_seminar_series_2015-2018.html" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's </a>Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.  This session is presented by Dr Roger Lee. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a>

Firepower 40:  The German Spring Offensive

This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series is presented by Dr Albert Palazzo and looks at the birth of the Artillery Intelligence fusion capability in WW1. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This presentation, part of the <a href="http://artilleryhistory.org/history_seminar_series/history_seminar_series_2015-2018.html" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's </a>Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series is presented by Dr Albert Palazzo and looks at the birth of the Artillery Intelligence fusion capability in WW1. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a> If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Firepower: The origins of Artillery Intelligence Fusion

We look at how the British and Japanese came about to select their aims and how they got to them. What was the British mission and what did Churchill understand of the mission to be?  How did Brooke Popham understand his mission and how did that impact the troops on the ground (and pilots in the air).  We have a slight diversion to look at the Whole of Government approach to defence and how the Australian Government undermined the Air Force and it's capabilities.  Why would they do that?  How effective was the Beaufort Bomber?  Was a defence procurement decision influenced by political needs? What role did the 'China incident' play with Japanese decision making processes?  How did COL Tsuji influence the decision to go south and east as opposed to north and west. The Imperial Japanese Navy was using 400 tonnes of oil an hour - how would they secure the resources they needed? What were the similarities and differences between the Japanese and British thinking? We look at Unity of Command in both the Japanese and British forces. How did issues with command structure effect each of the forces?  What was the relationship between Bennett and Percival?  Did Bennett's micromanagement of the Brigades limit their effectiveness.  How would command issues effect 22nd and 27th Brigade. What issues did LT GEN Yamashita have?  What is Gekokujo and why was Charlie Chaplin nearly assassinated? What was the May 15th incident and why did 350,000 people sign a petition in blood?

We look at how the British and Japanese came about to select their aims and how they got to them. What was the British mission and what did Churchill understand of the mission to be?  How did Brooke Popham understand his mission and how did that impact the troops on the ground (and pilots in the air).  We have a slight diversion to look at the Whole of Government approach to defence and how the Australian Government undermined the Air Force and it's capabilities.  Why would they do that?  How effective was the Beaufort Bomber?  Was a defence procurement decision influenced by political needs? What role did the 'China incident' play with Japanese decision making processes?  How did COL Tsuji influence the decision to go south and east as opposed to north and west. The Imperial Japanese Navy was using 400 tonnes of oil an hour - how would they secure the resources they needed? What were the similarities and differences between the Japanese and British thinking? We look at Unity of Command in both the Japanese and British forces. How did issues with command structure effect each of the forces? What was the relationship between Bennett and Percival?  Did Bennett's micromanagement of the Brigades limit their effectiveness.  How would command issues effect 22nd and 27th Brigade. What issues did LT GEN Yamashita have?  What is Gekokujo and why was Charlie Chaplin nearly assassinated? What was the May 15th incident and why did 350,000 people sign a petition in blood?

5 - Japanese and British selection and maintenance of aim for the Malaya Campaign

This episode of the podcast sees the transition from the encounter battle through to D Coy moving to being completely on the defensive.  11 Pl becomes decisively engaged, with enemy flanking to the north whilst being engaged by 3 MGs from the front.  As 11 Pl starts the call for fire, MAJ Smith calls for reinforcements in order to regain the initiative.  As the tempo of the artillery support increases, the audience at the Little Patty concert moves away to support the Coy in contact. 10 Pl moves towards the foot hills to the north, observing a force attempting to flank 11 Pl.  The Task Force initially refuses to reinforce the NZ 161 Bty, requiring time consuming switching between targets and adjustment.  On later is 161 reinforced with 2 further batteries. 2LT Dave Sabbens 12 Pl detaches a section to provide security to CHQ and moves off 2 up to attempt to marry up with 11 Pl.  By now 2 hours into the battle, each Pl has a bty in support.  10 Pl is down to 50% ammunition and requests and ammo resupply.  This is initially refused.  The pilots who had bought up Little Patty to Nui Dat. The US resupply would be 30 minutes which could be too late.  Moral and physical courage is shown by the RAAF pilots as they ignore restrictions from Canberra about flying into contact in order to provide supply to the troops in contact. The situation is so desperate that SGT Bob Buick, the PL SGT in 11 Pl calls in artillery on his on position.  The FO refuses to bring the artillery onto their position, but brings the rounds in as close as possible. 11 Pl moves back marry up with 12 Pl and they commence to move back to CHQ.  Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.  Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.  If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This episode of the podcast sees the transition from the encounter battle through to D Coy moving to being completely on the defensive.  11 Pl becomes decisively engaged, with enemy flanking to the north whilst being engaged by 3 MGs from the front.  As 11 Pl starts the call for fire, MAJ Smith calls for reinforcements in order to regain the initiative.  As the tempo of the artillery support increases, the audience at the Little Patty concert moves away to support the Coy in contact. 10 Pl moves towards the foot hills to the north, observing a force attempting to flank 11 Pl.  The Task Force initially refuses to reinforce the NZ 161 Bty, requiring time consuming switching between targets and adjustment.  On later is 161 reinforced with 2 further batteries. 2LT Dave Sabbens 12 Pl detaches a section to provide security to CHQ and moves off 2 up to attempt to marry up with 11 Pl.  By now 2 hours into the battle, each Pl has a bty in support.  10 Pl is down to 50% ammunition and requests and ammo resupply.  This is initially refused.  The pilots who had bought up Little Patty to Nui Dat. The US resupply would be 30 minutes which could be too late.  Moral and physical courage is shown by the RAAF pilots as they ignore restrictions from Canberra about flying into contact in order to provide supply to the troops in contact. The situation is so desperate that SGT Bob Buick, the PL SGT in 11 Pl calls in artillery on his on position.  The FO refuses to bring the artillery onto their position, but brings the rounds in as close as possible. 11 Pl moves back marry up with 12 Pl and they commence to move back to CHQ. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a> If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

28 - Long tan 6:  The transition to the defence

D Coy

The is the latest episode in our long interview with Dave Sabben, Pl Comd 11 Pl at the Battle of Long Tan.  There is a lot of valuable experience shared about what made D Coy different and how they were trained and prepared for war.  Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.  Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.  If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

The is the latest episode in our long interview with Dave Sabben, Pl Comd 11 Pl at the Battle of Long Tan.  There is a lot of valuable experience shared about what made D Coy different and how they were trained and prepared for war. Check out the <a href="https://theprinciplesofwar.com/podcast/?pk_campaign=libsyn&amp;pk_kwd=libsyn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">show notes</a> for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/surprisepodcast" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Principlesofwar/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Facebook.</a> If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

37 - How was D Coy prepared for battle?

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