Alan Hájek (Australian National University) gives a talk for the New Insights seminar series on 21st May 2015.  Abstract: A number of prominent authors—Levi, Spohn, Gilboa, Seidenfeld, and Price among them—hold that rational agents cannot assign subjective probabilities to their options while deliberating about which one they will choose. This has been called the "deliberation crowds out prediction" thesis. The thesis, if true, has important ramifications for many aspects of Bayesian epistemology, decision theory, and game theory. The stakes are high.The thesis is not true—or so I maintain. After some scene-setting, I will precisify and rebut several of the main arguments for the thesis. I will defend the rationality of assigning probabilities to options while deliberating about them: deliberation welcomes prediction. I will also consider application of the thesis, and its denial, to Pascal's Wager.

Alan Hájek (Australian National University) gives a talk for the New Insights seminar series on 21st May 2015. Abstract: A number of prominent authors—Levi, Spohn, Gilboa, Seidenfeld, and Price among them—hold that rational agents cannot assign subjective probabilities to their options while deliberating about which one they will choose. This has been called the "deliberation crowds out prediction" thesis. The thesis, if true, has important ramifications for many aspects of Bayesian epistemology, decision theory, and game theory. The stakes are high. The thesis is not true—or so I maintain. After some scene-setting, I will precisify and rebut several of the main arguments for the thesis. I will defend the rationality of assigning probabilities to options while deliberating about them: deliberation welcomes prediction. I will also consider application of the thesis, and its denial, to Pascal's Wager.

Deliberation welcomes prediction 

Roger White (MIT) gives the final talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015.

Reasoning with Plenitude 

Richard Cross (Notre Dame) gives a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015. The commentator is Christina Van Dyke, Calvin

Testimony, Error, and Reasonable Belief in Medieval Religious Epistemology 

John Hawthorne (Oxford/USC) gives a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015.

Fine-Tuning Fine-Tuning 

Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern) gives a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015.

What is Justified Group Belief 

Hans Halvorson (Princeton) give a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015. The commentator is John Pittard (Yale).

Foundations of the Fine-Tuning Argument 

Keith DeRose (Yale), gives a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015. The commentator is Jane Friedman (NYU).

How to Appear to Know that God Exists 

Paulina Sliwa (Cambridge) gives the first talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015.

Show and Tell 

Peter van Inwagen (Notre Dame) gives the second talk for the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015. The commentator is Jeffrey Sanford Russell (USC).

The Rev’d Mr Bayes and the Life Everlasting 

Richard Swinburne, University of Oxford, gives the first talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015.

Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious Belief 

New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology, a series of workshops held in Oxford University on 13th-14th March and 12th-13th June 2013.The aim of this project is to make a bold and lasting impact on religious epistemology.This project aims to bring recent developments in epistemology to bear on topics in the philosophy of religion in a way that will open up new channels of research in religious epistemology. The project is centered around, but not limited to, interesting and novel applications developing out of six main topics: (i) contextualism and pragmatic encroachment, (ii) safety and knowledge, (iii) epistemic defeat, (iv) testimony, (v) formal epistemology, and (vi) etiology of belief.The project will be led by John Hawthorne and will involve 3 postdoctoral researchers, 3 PhD students, 22 visiting research fellowships, 9 public lectures, 4 roundtable discussions, 6 workshops, and 1 major international conference.This project, valued at 1.3 million GBP, has been made possible by the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation.

New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology, a series of workshops held in Oxford University on 13th-14th March and 12th-13th June 2013. The aim of this project is to make a bold and lasting impact on religious epistemology. This project aims to bring recent developments in epistemology to bear on topics in the philosophy of religion in a way that will open up new channels of research in religious epistemology. The project is centered around, but not limited to, interesting and novel applications developing out of six main topics: (i) contextualism and pragmatic encroachment, (ii) safety and knowledge, (iii) epistemic defeat, (iv) testimony, (v) formal epistemology, and (vi) etiology of belief. The project will be led by John Hawthorne and will involve 3 postdoctoral researchers, 3 PhD students, 22 visiting research fellowships, 9 public lectures, 4 roundtable discussions, 6 workshops, and 1 major international conference. This project, valued at 1.3 million GBP, has been made possible by the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation.

Religious Epistemology, Contextualism, and Pragmatic Encroachment

Fifth talk given by Liz Jackson (Nortre Dame) at the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop on Formal Epistemology and Religious Epistemology, Oxford University, 9 December 2014.

Salvaging Pascal's Wager 

New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology lecture by Dan Howard-Snyder (Washington), 29th October 2013.

What is faith? 

Sandford Goldberg (Northwestern) gives the fourth presentation at the Testimony and Religious Epistemology held on 24th and 25th June 2014 by New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop, Oxford University. The commenter: John Hawthorne (Oxford)

Can Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony aid the case of Justified Religious Belief? 

Richard G. Swinburne, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, University of Oxford, gives a talk for the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology seminar series. Abstract: Epiphenomenalism is the scientific theory that conscious events never cause physical events (and so intentions never cause brain events).  The Libet programme seeks to prove epiphenomenalism by showing that it never makes any difference to a sequence of brain events whether or not an intention occurs during the course of it. To show that, it needs to show when (relative to brain events) some intention occurs; and to show that it relies on the reports of subjects about when and whether they form any intention. But while we are always justified in believing claims based on apparent experience, memory, or testimony in the absence of defeaters, it is a defeater to any such claim that some event occurred, that the apparent experience, memory, or testimony was not caused by the event. So we would only be justified in believing these reports if we were justified in believing that the reports were caused by subjects' having an intention to make words come out of their mouths which correctly report their other intentions. So the programme to prove epiphenomenalism relies on evidence about subjects' intentions on which it would only be justified in relying if epiphenomenalism is false. Hence the programme is self-defeating; and so is any other programme purporting to show that we can have a justified belief in epiphenomenalism and so in the causal closure of the physical.

The inevitable implausibility of physical determinism 

Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern) gives the seventh and last presentation, as part of the Testimony and Religious Epistemology workshop, held on 24th and 25th June 2014 by New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop,Oxford University.

Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Testimony 

Fifth talk given by Professor Edward Wierenga (Rochester) at the Defeat and Religious Epistemology for the New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology Workshop Oxford University held on 17th March 2014

Defeaters, Proper Functioning, and the Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism 

First talk given by Dr Charity Anderson (Oxford) at the Defeat and Religious Epistemology from the New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology Workshop Oxford University on 17th March 2014

Defeat, Testimony, and Miracles 

Fourth talk given by Rima Basu (USC) at the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop on Formal Epistemology and Religious Epistemology, Oxford University, 9 December 2014.

Against the Orthodoxy: Rethinking Epistemic Reasons and Pascal's Wager 

Second talk given by Jason Konek (Bristol) and Billy Dunaway (Oxford) at the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop on Formal Epistemology and Religious Epistemology, Oxford University, 8 December 2014.

Foundations for an Accuracy-based Approach to Imprecise Credence 

Laura Callahan (Oxford) gives the fifth presentation at the Testimony and Religious Epistemology workshop, held on 24th and 25th June 2014 by New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop Oxford University. The commentator is Peter Graham (UC-Riverside).

Limits on Religious Testimony: Lessons on Morality 

Third talk given by Jonathan Weisberg (Toronto) at the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop on Formal Epistemology and Religious Epistemology, Oxford University, 8 December 2014.

Divine Indifference, or Whatever 

Fourth talk given by Professor John Pittard (Yale Divinity School) at the Defeat and Religious Epistemology for the New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology Workshop, Oxford University on 18th March 2014

Fundamental Disagreements and Defeat 

Second talk given by Dr. J. Adam Carter (Edinburgh) at the Defeat and Religious Epistemology from the New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology Workshop, Oxford University held on 17th March 2014

(Undercutting) Epistemic Defeat and the 'Conciliatory' Road to Agnosticism 

Lizzie Fricker (Oxford), gives the sixth presentation Testimony and Religious Epistemology workshop, held on 24th and 25th June 2014 by New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop, Oxford University The commentator is Mikkel Gerken (Edinburgh)

Epistemic Trust in Oneself and Others – An Argument from Analogy 

Sixth and final talk given by Professor Roger White (MIT) at the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop Formal Epistemology and Religious Epistemology, Oxford University, 9 December 2014.

Updating on Evil 

Paulina Sliwa (Cambridge) gives the third presentation of the Testimony and Religious Epistemology workshop geld onb 24th and 25th June 2014 by New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop, Oxford University. The commentator is Alison Hills (Oxford)

Understanding and Knowing by Testimony 

First talk given by Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (Rutgers) at the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop on Formal Epistemology and Religious Epistemology, Oxford University, 8 December 2014.

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