Renaud BIDOU's guest appearances

Renaud BIDOU

Black Hat Briefings, Las Vegas 2005 [Video] Presentations from the security conference

Black Hat Briefings, Las Vegas 2006 [Video] Presentations from the security conference

Black Hat Briefings, Las Vegas 2006 [Audio] Presentations from the security conference

Black Hat Briefings, Las Vegas 2005 [Audio] Presentations from the security conference

Sherri Sparks

MICHAEL SUTTON

Jamie Butler

Jeremiah Grossman

Alexander Kornbrust

Himanshu Dwivedi

David Maynor

David Litchfield

Kevin Mandia

Scott Stender

Bruce Potter

Alex Stamos

Shawn Moyer

Paul Simmonds

Paul Vixie

OwlTail

This is a real story of modern extortion in a cyberworld. Bots have replaced dynamite and you don't buy "protection" to prevent your shop from going in flames; you buy "consulting" to prevent your IT from beeing DoSed. From the first limited synflood to the conclusion, we will review those crazy 48 hours that end up in a one to one digital fight. We will see in depth which attacks and mitigation techniques where involved and how they both evolved quickly in complexity and intensity. As a conclusion we will see which were the major weaknesses, found either in the network architecture, the security perimeter and the target application, and how it would have been possible to prevent such attack, limit its impact... and save money.Renaud Bidou has been working in the field of IT security for about 10 years. He first performed consulting missions for telcos, pen-tests and post-mortem audits, and designed several security architectures. In 2000 he built the first operational Security Operation Center in France which quickly became the 4th French CERT and member of the FIRST. He then joined Radware as the security expert for Europe, handling high criticity security cases.In the mean time Renaud is an active member of the rstack team and the French Honeynet Project with studies on honeynet containment, honeypot farms and network traffic analysis. He regularly publishes research articles in the French security magazine MISC and teaches in several universities in France.

This is a real story of modern extortion in a cyberworld. Bots have replaced dynamite and you don't buy "protection" to prevent your shop from going in flames; you buy "consulting" to prevent your IT from beeing DoSed. From the first limited synflood to the conclusion, we will review those crazy 48 hours that end up in a one to one digital fight. We will see in depth which attacks and mitigation techniques where involved and how they both evolved quickly in complexity and intensity. As a conclusion we will see which were the major weaknesses, found either in the network architecture, the security perimeter and the target application, and how it would have been possible to prevent such attack, limit its impact... and save money. Renaud Bidou has been working in the field of IT security for about 10 years. He first performed consulting missions for telcos, pen-tests and post-mortem audits, and designed several security architectures. In 2000 he built the first operational Security Operation Center in France which quickly became the 4th French CERT and member of the FIRST. He then joined Radware as the security expert for Europe, handling high criticity security cases. In the mean time Renaud is an active member of the rstack team and the French Honeynet Project with studies on honeynet containment, honeypot farms and network traffic analysis. He regularly publishes research articles in the French security magazine MISC and teaches in several universities in France.

Renaud Bidou:  A Dirty BlackMail DoS Story

Renaud Bidou: A Dirty BlackMail DoS Story

Technologies emerge on a regular basis with new promises of better security. This is more or less true. However we know there are still weaknesses and that 100% security is not realistic. Therefore the real need when deploying a new security device is to know its limits. IPS are part of those new technologies. They are oversold by marketing speeches and promises of an absolute security. Guess what? This is not exactly the truth....		The purpose of this speech is not to discredit IPS but to help in understanding the limits of technologies that are involved. We will particularly focus on the following subjects:		    * conceptual weaknesses and ways to detect "transparent" inline equipments	    * signatures issues	    * hardware architecture limitations and common jokes	    * performance vs security necessary trade-off and consequences	    * behavioral, heuristics, neuronal stuff etc. reality and limitations 		Through examples, proofs of concept and test beds results we should provide a broad view of IPS reality, what you can expect from them now and what they will never do for you.		Renaud Bidou has been working in the field of IT security for about 10 years. He first performed consulting missions for telcos, pen-tests and post-mortem audits, and designed several security architectures. In 2000 he built the first operational Security Operation Center in France which quickly became the 4th French CERT and member of the FIRST. He then joined Radware as the security expert for Europe, handling high severity security cases.		In the mean time Renaud is an active member of the rstack team and the French Honeynet Project which studies on honeynet containment, honeypot farms and network traffic analysis. He regularly publishes research articles in the French security magazine MISC and teaches in several universities in France."

Technologies emerge on a regular basis with new promises of better security. This is more or less true. However we know there are still weaknesses and that 100% security is not realistic. Therefore the real need when deploying a new security device is to know its limits. IPS are part of those new technologies. They are oversold by marketing speeches and promises of an absolute security. Guess what? This is not exactly the truth.... 	 	The purpose of this speech is not to discredit IPS but to help in understanding the limits of technologies that are involved. We will particularly focus on the following subjects: 	 	 * conceptual weaknesses and ways to detect "transparent" inline equipments 	 * signatures issues 	 * hardware architecture limitations and common jokes 	 * performance vs security necessary trade-off and consequences 	 * behavioral, heuristics, neuronal stuff etc. reality and limitations 	 	Through examples, proofs of concept and test beds results we should provide a broad view of IPS reality, what you can expect from them now and what they will never do for you. 	 	Renaud Bidou has been working in the field of IT security for about 10 years. He first performed consulting missions for telcos, pen-tests and post-mortem audits, and designed several security architectures. In 2000 he built the first operational Security Operation Center in France which quickly became the 4th French CERT and member of the FIRST. He then joined Radware as the security expert for Europe, handling high severity security cases. 	 	In the mean time Renaud is an active member of the rstack team and the French Honeynet Project which studies on honeynet containment, honeypot farms and network traffic analysis. He regularly publishes research articles in the French security magazine MISC and teaches in several universities in France."

Renaud BIDOU: IPS Short comings

"Technologies emerge on a regular basis with new promises of better security. This is more or less true. However we know there are still weaknesses and that 100% security is not realistic. Therefore the real need when deploying a new security device is to know its limits. IPS are part of those new technologies. They are oversold by marketing speeches and promises of an absolute security. Guess what? This is not exactly the truth....		The purpose of this speech is not to discredit IPS but to help in understanding the limits of technologies that are involved. We will particularly focus on the following subjects:		    * conceptual weaknesses and ways to detect "transparent" inline equipments	    * signatures issues	    * hardware architecture limitations and common jokes	    * performance vs security necessary trade-off and consequences	    * behavioral, heuristics, neuronal stuff etc. reality and limitations 		Through examples, proofs of concept and test beds results we should provide a broad view of IPS reality, what you can expect from them now and what they will never do for you.		Renaud Bidou has been working in the field of IT security for about 10 years. He first performed consulting missions for telcos, pen-tests and post-mortem audits, and designed several security architectures. In 2000 he built the first operational Security Operation Center in France which quickly became the 4th French CERT and member of the FIRST. He then joined Radware as the security expert for Europe, handling high severity security cases.		In the mean time Renaud is an active member of the rstack team and the French Honeynet Project which studies on honeynet containment, honeypot farms and network traffic analysis. He regularly publishes research articles in the French security magazine MISC and teaches in several universities in France."

"Technologies emerge on a regular basis with new promises of better security. This is more or less true. However we know there are still weaknesses and that 100% security is not realistic. Therefore the real need when deploying a new security device is to know its limits. IPS are part of those new technologies. They are oversold by marketing speeches and promises of an absolute security. Guess what? This is not exactly the truth.... 	 	The purpose of this speech is not to discredit IPS but to help in understanding the limits of technologies that are involved. We will particularly focus on the following subjects: 	 	 * conceptual weaknesses and ways to detect "transparent" inline equipments 	 * signatures issues 	 * hardware architecture limitations and common jokes 	 * performance vs security necessary trade-off and consequences 	 * behavioral, heuristics, neuronal stuff etc. reality and limitations 	 	Through examples, proofs of concept and test beds results we should provide a broad view of IPS reality, what you can expect from them now and what they will never do for you. 	 	Renaud Bidou has been working in the field of IT security for about 10 years. He first performed consulting missions for telcos, pen-tests and post-mortem audits, and designed several security architectures. In 2000 he built the first operational Security Operation Center in France which quickly became the 4th French CERT and member of the FIRST. He then joined Radware as the security expert for Europe, handling high severity security cases. 	 	In the mean time Renaud is an active member of the rstack team and the French Honeynet Project which studies on honeynet containment, honeypot farms and network traffic analysis. He regularly publishes research articles in the French security magazine MISC and teaches in several universities in France."