Barry Weingast's guest appearances

Barry Weingast

EconTalk

EconTalk Archives, 2014

EconTalk at the Hoover Institution

The Governance Podcast

Chris Blattman

Daron Acemoglu

Charles Marohn

Bryan Caplan

Deirdre McCloskey

James Otteson

Luigi Zingales

David Autor

Emily Oster

Richard Epstein

Vernon Smith

Laurence Kotlikoff

Steven Teles

John Christy

Kerry Emanuel

OwlTail

What are the paradoxes of economic development? How can we preserve liberal democracy in an era of populism and polarisation? In this episode of the Governance Podcast, Professor Barry Weingast of Stanford University joins Professor Mark Pennington of King’s College London for a conversation on the key lessons we’ve learned from the study of political economy.Subscribe on iTunes and SpotifySubscribe to the Governance Podcast on iTunes and Spotify today and get all our latest episodes directly in your pocket.The GuestBarry R. Weingast is the Ward C. Krebs Family Professor, Department of Political Science, and a Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution. He served as Chair of the Department of Political Science from 1996 through 2001. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Weingast’s research focuses on the political foundation of markets, economic reform, and regulation. He has written extensively on problems of political economy of development, federalism and decentralization, legal institutions and the rule of law, and democracy. Weingast is co-author of Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (with Douglass C. North and John Joseph Wallis, 2009, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) and Analytic Narratives (1998, Princeton). He edited (with Donald Wittman) The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (Oxford University Press, 2006). Weingast has won numerous awards, including the William H. Riker Prize, the Heinz Eulau Prize (with Ken Shepsle), the Franklin L. Burdette Pi Sigma Alpha Award (with Kenneth Schultz), and the James L. Barr Memorial Prize in Public Economics.Follow UsFor more information about our upcoming podcasts and events, follow us on facebook or twitter (@csgskcl).Skip Ahead1:00 In response to the age old question, ‘why are some countries rich and others poor?’ you argue that some countries fail to develop because they are stuck in a ‘violence trap.’ What do you mean by that? 3:46: How does your explanation for the persistence of poverty differ from others? 6:08: How can developing countries escape from the violence trap? 7:50: Economists have often assumed that markets existed in societies before states began to interfere with them. You argue that markets don’t necessarily exist in many developing societies, but violence does. Why do so many economists have a different starting point? 9:43: In many ways, you’re arguing against the idea that markets are natural phenomena. You argue instead that markets have to be sustained within certain institutional conditions- but whether you actually get to those institutional conditions is the big question. 13:22: It’s not only markets that aren’t natural phenomena—democracy is also not a natural phenomenon. How can we build democracy where it doesn’t exist? 15:12: Is there anything that external bodies or national policies can recommend to help governments reduce the stakes of power? 17:35: How do you respond to Easterly’s arguments about foreign intervention? 18:52: Looking at your insights into early economic development in Europe, much of the good outcomes are unintended. Could we conclude that development isn’t something one can plan or design policy for? 21:48: What is an example of a democracy-promoting policy that isn’t just focused on creating elections? 23:23: What is the role of beliefs or moral attitudes in your framework? 25:55: Is there a role for political entrepreneurs to help societies out of their violence traps? 27:28: Do you see any implications of your research for contemporary events? Today we’re seeing a lot of ‘us versus them’ zero sum thinking. Can people find ways to discover mutual gains from cooperation in this environment? 30:25: What is the contemporary importance of your work on market-preserving federalism? 35:35: How can we explain the current shift in public opinion against market-preserving federalism across the west? 39:02: What are your future projects?

What are the paradoxes of economic development? How can we preserve liberal democracy in an era of populism and polarisation? In this episode of the Governance Podcast, Professor Barry Weingast of Stanford University joins Professor Mark Pennington of King’s College London for a conversation on the key lessons we’ve learned from the study of political economy.Subscribe on iTunes and Spotify Subscribe to the Governance Podcast on <a href="https://itunes.apple.com/gb/podcast/the-governance-podcast/id1402038733?mt=2" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">iTunes</a> and <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/0OzpIxDuGWwWtwlpXQEL1U" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Spotify</a> today and get all our latest episodes directly in your pocket.The Guest Barry R. Weingast is the Ward C. Krebs Family Professor, Department of Political Science, and a Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution. He served as Chair of the Department of Political Science from 1996 through 2001. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Weingast’s research focuses on the political foundation of markets, economic reform, and regulation. He has written extensively on problems of political economy of development, federalism and decentralization, legal institutions and the rule of law, and democracy. Weingast is co-author of Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (with Douglass C. North and John Joseph Wallis, 2009, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) and Analytic Narratives (1998, Princeton). He edited (with Donald Wittman) The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (Oxford University Press, 2006). Weingast has won numerous awards, including the William H. Riker Prize, the Heinz Eulau Prize (with Ken Shepsle), the Franklin L. Burdette Pi Sigma Alpha Award (with Kenneth Schultz), and the James L. Barr Memorial Prize in Public Economics.Follow Us For more information about our upcoming podcasts and events, follow us on <a href="https://www.facebook.com/csgskcl/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">facebook</a> or <a href="https://twitter.com/csgskcl?lang=en" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">twitter</a> (@csgskcl).Skip Ahead 1:00 In response to the age old question, ‘why are some countries rich and others poor?’ you argue that some countries fail to develop because they are stuck in a ‘violence trap.’ What do you mean by that? 3:46: How does your explanation for the persistence of poverty differ from others? 6:08: How can developing countries escape from the violence trap? 7:50: Economists have often assumed that markets existed in societies before states began to interfere with them. You argue that markets don’t necessarily exist in many developing societies, but violence does. Why do so many economists have a different starting point? 9:43: In many ways, you’re arguing against the idea that markets are natural phenomena. You argue instead that markets have to be sustained within certain institutional conditions- but whether you actually get to those institutional conditions is the big question. 13:22: It’s not only markets that aren’t natural phenomena—democracy is also not a natural phenomenon. How can we build democracy where it doesn’t exist? 15:12: Is there anything that external bodies or national policies can recommend to help governments reduce the stakes of power? 17:35: How do you respond to Easterly’s arguments about foreign intervention? 18:52: Looking at your insights into early economic development in Europe, much of the good outcomes are unintended. Could we conclude that development isn’t something one can plan or design policy for? 21:48: What is an example of a democracy-promoting policy that isn’t just focused on creating elections? 23:23: What is the role of beliefs or moral attitudes in your framework? 25:55: Is there a role for political entrepreneurs to help societies out of their violence traps? 27:28: Do you see any implications of your research for contemporary events? Today we’re seeing a lot of ‘us versus them’ zero sum thinking. Can people find ways to discover mutual gains from cooperation in this environment? 30:25: What is the contemporary importance of your work on market-preserving federalism? 35:35: How can we explain the current shift in public opinion against market-preserving federalism across the west? 39:02: What are your future projects?

The Road to Peace and Prosperity: A Conversation with Barry Weingast

Barry Weingast, professor of political science at Stanford University and senior fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the nature of law. Weingast takes issue with some of the standard views of law, and proposes a better way to understand law. The two discuss the fundamental principles of law, how it can emerge in a decentralized way to resolve disputes over property and other commercial and social interactions. Examples include Iceland, Ancient Greece, and California during the gold rush. Also considered are how laws coordinate expectations and the way that social pressure can be used to enforce law in a decentralized fashion.

Barry Weingast on Law

Barry Weingast, professor of political science at Stanford University and senior fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the nature of law. Weingast takes issue with some of the standard views of law, and proposes a better way to understand law. The two discuss the fundamental principles of law, how it can emerge in a decentralized way to resolve disputes over property and other commercial and social interactions. Examples include Iceland, Ancient Greece, and California during the gold rush. Also considered are how laws coordinate expectations and the way that social pressure can be used to enforce law in a decentralized fashion.