Jerry Schneider's guest appearances

Jerry Schneider

Black Hat Briefings, USA 2007 [Video] Presentations from the security conference.

Black Hat Briefings, USA 2007 [Audio] Presentations from the security conference.

joeverdegan.com

Daniel Peck

Chris Palmer

Keith Jones

Mark Ryan

Bruce Schneier

Tony Sager

John Viega

Mike Shaver

Cody Pierce

Chris Paget

Justin N. Ferguson

Maria Cirino

Brandon Baker

Job De Haas

John Terrill

OwlTail

Circle

Kaukauna, Wisconsin's Jerry Schneider has been active in the racing scene at his home track Wisconsin International Raceway for several decades now. Listen in as we talk to Jerry about the past and the present - including where the idea came from for WIR's Circle of Fame. Listen in!

Kaukauna, Wisconsin's Jerry Schneider has been active in the racing scene at his home track Wisconsin International Raceway for several decades now. Listen in as we talk to Jerry about the past and the present - including where the idea came from for WIR's Circle of Fame. Listen in!

JERRY SCHNEIDER - TALKIN' RACIN', WIR CIRCLE OF FAME AND MORE

Targeting an enterprise attack at just a few employees seems to be yielding the best results, since it lowers the risk of discovering the exploit. Yet the typical DNS cache poisoning approach, aimed at various levels in the DNS server hierarchy or the enterprise server itself, is not as effective as it could be, primarily because so many people are affected that detection is rapid...  	There is one approach to DNS cache poisoning that can control the attack surface and is particularly effective when executed from within the enterprise. Rather than attempting to poison the enterprise DNS server or other external caches, the internal DNS cache within a Windows PC is targeted. Additionally, forensic analysis of the infected PC is hindered by the TimeToLive and volatility of these cache entries.  	I will demonstrate this type of attack using two machines on a local lan, and include some analysis of the firewall and configuration issues needed to defend against this type of exploit.

Targeting an enterprise attack at just a few employees seems to be yielding the best results, since it lowers the risk of discovering the exploit. Yet the typical DNS cache poisoning approach, aimed at various levels in the DNS server hierarchy or the enterprise server itself, is not as effective as it could be, primarily because so many people are affected that detection is rapid... 	There is one approach to DNS cache poisoning that can control the attack surface and is particularly effective when executed from within the enterprise. Rather than attempting to poison the enterprise DNS server or other external caches, the internal DNS cache within a Windows PC is targeted. Additionally, forensic analysis of the infected PC is hindered by the TimeToLive and volatility of these cache entries. 	I will demonstrate this type of attack using two machines on a local lan, and include some analysis of the firewall and configuration issues needed to defend against this type of exploit.

Jerry Schneider: Reflection DNS Poisoning