Pete Mandik's guest appearances

Pete Mandik

Consciousness Live!

Extrapolator

Mind to Mind

Sean Carroll

Philip Goff

Joseph Ledoux

Bernardo Kastrup

David Papineau

David Chalmers

Evan Thompson

Keith Frankish

Bryce Huebner

Susan Schneider

Nicholas Humphrey

Monica Gagliano

Elizabeth Loftus

Richard Lang

Heather Berlin

OwlTail

Pete Mandik is professor of philosophy at William Paterson University of New Jersey. He works on topics at the intersection between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences and is particularly interested in naturalistic accounts of consciousness and intentionality. We began by talking about Pete’s background and influences, then dived deep into his views about consciousness, representation, and consciousness. Join us to learn why ‘what it is like’ talk is empty, why colour sensations are a myth, and why introspection is more like recalibration than self-monitoring. Timings 0:00:24: Introduction 0:01:46 Why Pete became a philosopher 0:12:00 Experiences with LSD 0:24:24 Quine and anti-foundationalism 0:30:25 The relation between philosophy and science 0:38:45 Introduction to Pete’s view of consciousness 0:40:43 Three views of the data for a theory of consciousness 0:46:36 A third-person approach to consciousness 0:50:56 ‘What it is like’ to be a bat 0:54:26 Against phenomenal consciousness 0:58:11 The emptiness of what-it-is-like talk 1:06:21 A problem for representational theories of consciousness 1:13:59 A sense in which consciousness is intrinsic 1:18:30 Can consciousness be indeterminate? 1:21:37 Is there anything special about the first-person perspective? 1:26:32 The case against nonconceptual content 1:41:10 The myth of colour sensations 1:51:39 The nature of introspection 2:09:52 Concerns about illusionism 2:24:42: The future of consciousness studies and what to expect from Pete Mandik Further reading If you would like to explore Pete’s views in more detail, you could start with these three papers, which deal with topics covered in the interview: ‘Beware of the Unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don’t exist’. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16(1) (2009): 5–36. ‘The myth of color sensations, or How not to see a yellow banana’. Topics in Cognitive Science 9(1) (2017): 228–40. ‘The introspectibility of brain states as such’. In, edited by Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland (pp 66–87). Cambridge University Press, 2005. You can find out more about Pete at these webpages https://wpconnect.wpunj.edu/directories/faculty/default.cfm?user=mandikp https://philpeople.org/profiles/pete-mandik

Pete Mandik is professor of philosophy at William Paterson University of New Jersey. He works on topics at the intersection between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences and is particularly interested in naturalistic accounts of consciousness and intentionality. We began by talking about Pete’s background and influences, then dived deep into his views about consciousness, representation, and consciousness. Join us to learn why ‘what it is like’ talk is empty, why colour sensations are a myth, and why introspection is more like recalibration than self-monitoring. Timings 0:00:24: Introduction 0:01:46 Why Pete became a philosopher 0:12:00 Experiences with LSD 0:24:24 Quine and anti-foundationalism 0:30:25 The relation between philosophy and science 0:38:45 Introduction to Pete’s view of consciousness 0:40:43 Three views of the data for a theory of consciousness 0:46:36 A third-person approach to consciousness 0:50:56 ‘What it is like’ to be a bat 0:54:26 Against phenomenal consciousness 0:58:11 The emptiness of what-it-is-like talk 1:06:21 A problem for representational theories of consciousness 1:13:59 A sense in which consciousness is intrinsic 1:18:30 Can consciousness be indeterminate? 1:21:37 Is there anything special about the first-person perspective? 1:26:32 The case against nonconceptual content 1:41:10 The myth of colour sensations 1:51:39 The nature of introspection 2:09:52 Concerns about illusionism 2:24:42: The future of consciousness studies and what to expect from Pete Mandik Further reading If you would like to explore Pete’s views in more detail, you could start with these three papers, which deal with topics covered in the interview: ‘Beware of the Unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don’t exist’. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16(1) (2009): 5–36. ‘The myth of color sensations, or How not to see a yellow banana’. Topics in Cognitive Science 9(1) (2017): 228–40. ‘The introspectibility of brain states as such’. In, edited by Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland (pp 66–87). Cambridge University Press, 2005. You can find out more about Pete at these webpages <a href="https://wpconnect.wpunj.edu/directories/faculty/default.cfm?user=mandikp" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://wpconnect.wpunj.edu/directories/faculty/default.cfm?user=mandikp</a> <a href="https://philpeople.org/profiles/pete-mandik" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://philpeople.org/profiles/pete-mandik</a>

In this episode, Geoff Allen speaks with Pete Mandik about perception and reality. They touch on some of the most intriguing issues concerning representation, egocentricity and perspective. Moreover, they discuss the different ways that minds make sense of reality – such as, the conception of hydrogen versus the conception of a hipster. Geoff and Pete start with a more general discussion of backgrounds and upbringings. They swap stories of being children with philosophical thoughts and, later, discovering philosophy as a path. They also cover: popularising philosophy; mixing philosophy with art and music; drawing on empirical work; the PR problems of academics and intellectuals; political persecution of academics (in Mexico and Hungary); totalising projects for unifying knowledge; intellectual modesty; and other topics. *** Pete Mandik is a Professor of Philosophy at William Paterson University. He is the author of the books Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind (2010) and This is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction (2013), and a co-author of the book Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Mind and Brain (2006). His latest book, Physicalist Theories of Consciousness, will be published by Cambridge University Press as part of the Elements in Philosophy of Mind series, edited by Keith Frankish. Pete’s research touches on points of intersection between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences, especially neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence. He is primarily interested in naturalistic accounts of consciousness and intentionality. His main lines of research to date have focused largely on three areas: (i) neurophilosophical explanations of phenomenal consciousness; (ii) artificial-life experiments on the evolutionary emergence of representational content; and (iii) the role of action-oriented representations as the basis for enactive cognition and perception. http://www.petemandik.com

In this episode, Geoff Allen speaks with Pete Mandik about perception and reality. They touch on some of the most intriguing issues concerning representation, egocentricity and perspective. Moreover, they discuss the different ways that minds make sense of reality – such as, the conception of hydrogen versus the conception of a hipster. Geoff and Pete start with a more general discussion of backgrounds and upbringings. They swap stories of being children with philosophical thoughts and, later, discovering philosophy as a path. They also cover: popularising philosophy; mixing philosophy with art and music; drawing on empirical work; the PR problems of academics and intellectuals; political persecution of academics (in Mexico and Hungary); totalising projects for unifying knowledge; intellectual modesty; and other topics. *** Pete Mandik is a Professor of Philosophy at William Paterson University. He is the author of the books Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind (2010) and This is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction (2013), and a co-author of the book Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Mind and Brain (2006). His latest book, Physicalist Theories of Consciousness, will be published by Cambridge University Press as part of the Elements in Philosophy of Mind series, edited by Keith Frankish. Pete’s research touches on points of intersection between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences, especially neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence. He is primarily interested in naturalistic accounts of consciousness and intentionality. His main lines of research to date have focused largely on three areas: (i) neurophilosophical explanations of phenomenal consciousness; (ii) artificial-life experiments on the evolutionary emergence of representational content; and (iii) the role of action-oriented representations as the basis for enactive cognition and perception. <a href="http://www.petemandik.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">http://www.petemandik.com</a>

#15 - Pete Mandik: Perceiving the World

Alex Kiefer

Join me for a discussion with Alex Kiefer, a Lecturer at Monash University, and Pete Mandik, a professor at William Patterson University, as we discuss predictive coding, mental representation, the Free Energy Principle, and a lot more! Alex’s websitePete’s websitevideo discussion

Join me for a discussion with Alex Kiefer, a Lecturer at Monash University, and Pete Mandik, a professor at William Patterson University, as we discuss predictive coding, mental representation, the Free Energy Principle, and a lot more! <ul><li><a href="http://alexbkiefer.net" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Alex’s website</a></li><li><a href="http://www.petemandik.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Pete’s website</a></li></ul>video discussion

Alex Kiefer and Pete Mandik Live!

Join me for a discussion with Pete Mandik, a professor of philosophy at William Patterson universityvideo discussion

Join me for a discussion with Pete Mandik, a professor of philosophy at William Patterson universityvideo discussion