23 - Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education
23 - Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education
We look at two settings with asymmetric information; one side of a game knows something that the other side does not. We... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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22 - Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
22 - Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
In business or personal relationships, promises and threats of good and bad behavior tomorrow may provide good incentive... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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24 - Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse
24 - Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse
We discuss auctions. We first distinguish two extremes: common values and private values. We hold a common value auction... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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21 - Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
21 - Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
We discuss repeated games, aiming to unpack the intuition that the promise of rewards and the threat of punishment in th... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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20 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
20 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
We first play and then analyze wars of attrition; the games that afflict trench warfare, strikes, and businesses in some... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
We analyze three games using our new solution concept, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The first game involves player... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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18 - Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
18 - Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
We consider games that have both simultaneous and sequential components, combining ideas from before and after the midte... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
We develop a simple model of bargaining, starting from an ultimatum game (one person makes the other a take it or leave ... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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16 - Backward induction: reputation and duels
16 - Backward induction: reputation and duels
In the first half of the lecture, we consider the chain-store paradox. We discuss how to build the idea of reputation in... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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15 - Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
15 - Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
We first discuss Zermelo's theorem: that games like tic-tac-toe or chess have a solution. That is, either there is a way... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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