Ranked #1
02 - Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
02 - Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
At the start of the lecture, we introduce the "formal ingredients" of a game: the players, their strategies and their pa... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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Ranked #2
18 - Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
18 - Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
We consider games that have both simultaneous and sequential components, combining ideas from before and after the midte... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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Ranked #3
17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
We develop a simple model of bargaining, starting from an ultimatum game (one person makes the other a take it or leave ... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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Ranked #4
11 - Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
11 - Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
We discuss evolution and game theory, and introduce the concept of evolutionary stability. We ask what kinds of strategi... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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Ranked #5
04 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
04 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
We continue the idea (from last time) of playing a best response to what we believe others will do. More particularly, w... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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Ranked #6
12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
We apply the idea of evolutionary stability to consider the evolution of social conventions. Then we consider games that... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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Ranked #7
05 - Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
05 - Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
We first define formally the new concept from last time: Nash equilibrium. Then we discuss why we might be interested in... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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Ranked #8
09 - Mixed strategies in theory and tennis
09 - Mixed strategies in theory and tennis
We continue our discussion of mixed strategies. First we discuss the payoff to a mixed strategy, pointing out that it mu... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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Ranked #9
06 - Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
06 - Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes.... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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Ranked #10
08 - Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
08 - Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
We first complete our discussion of the candidate-voter model showing, in particular, that, in equilibrium, two candidat... Read more
9 Oct 2009
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