Dino Dai Zovi's guest appearances

Dino Dai Zovi

Black Hat Briefings, Las Vegas 2006 [Video] Presentations from the security conference

Black Hat Briefings, Las Vegas 2006 [Audio] Presentations from the security conference

Security Conversations

Zane Lackey

Alex Stamos

Andrew Cushman

Jeremiah Grossman

Brendan O'Connor

Kevin Mandia

Tom Gallagher

Chris Eng

Bruce Potter

Tod Beardsley

Pete Finnigan

Dan Kaminsky

Stefan Frei

Ryan Cunningham

Emmanuele Zambon

OwlTail

Dino Dai Zovi, co-founder and CTO of Capsule8, joins the podcast to talk about the fallout from the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities, the transition from security research to managing a VC-funded start-up and reminisce about his time as a famous Pwn2Own MacBook hacker.Links:Part One: Detecting Meltdown using Capsule8Part Two: Detecting Meltdown and Spectre by Detecting Cache Side Channels 10 questions for MacBook hacker Dino Dai ZoviDino Dai Zovi on Twitter

Dino Dai Zovi, co-founder and CTO of Capsule8, joins the podcast to talk about the fallout from the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities, the transition from security research to managing a VC-funded start-up and reminisce about his time as a famous Pwn2Own MacBook hacker.Links:<ul><li><a href="https://capsule8.com/blog/detecting-meltdown-using-capsule8/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Part One: Detecting Meltdown using Capsule8</a></li><li><a href="https://capsule8.com/blog/detecting-meltdown-spectre-detecting-cache-side-channels/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Part Two: Detecting Meltdown and Spectre by Detecting Cache Side Channels </a></li><li><a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/10-questions-for-macbook-hacker-dino-dai-zovi/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">10 questions for MacBook hacker Dino Dai Zovi</a></li><li><a href="https://twitter.com/dinodaizovi" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Dino Dai Zovi on Twitter</a></li></ul>

Dino Dai Zovi, co-founder and CTO, Capsule8

Hardware-supported CPU virtualization extensions such as Intel's VT-x allow multiple operating systems to be run at full speed and without modification simultaneously on the same processor. These extensions are already supported in shipping processors such as the Intel® Core Solo and Duo processors found in laptops released in early 2006 with availability in desktop and server processors following later in the year. While these extensions are very useful for multiple-OS computing, they also present useful capabilities to rootkit authors. On VT-capable hardware, an attacker may install a rootkit "hypervisor" that transparently runs the original operating system in a VM. The rootkit would be loaded in physical memory pages that are inaccessible to the running OS and can mediate device access to hide blocks on disk.  This presentation will describe how VT-x can be used by rootkit authors, demonstrate a rootkit based on these techniques, and begin to explore how such rootkits may be detected.		Dino Dai Zovi is a principal member of Matasano Security where he performs consulting engagements as well as research and development. Dino is a computer security professional and researcher with over 7 years of experience in software, web application, and network penetration testing, application and operating system source code review, cryptosystem design and review, malware analysis, security tool development, and Red Team security analysis for Fortune 100 firms and federal government departments and agencies. Dino's other research projects include KARMA, a wireless client-side security assessment toolkit, and Viha, the first monitor-mode wireless driver for Apple's AirPort 802.11b network cards."

Hardware-supported CPU virtualization extensions such as Intel's VT-x allow multiple operating systems to be run at full speed and without modification simultaneously on the same processor. These extensions are already supported in shipping processors such as the Intel® Core Solo and Duo processors found in laptops released in early 2006 with availability in desktop and server processors following later in the year. While these extensions are very useful for multiple-OS computing, they also present useful capabilities to rootkit authors. On VT-capable hardware, an attacker may install a rootkit "hypervisor" that transparently runs the original operating system in a VM. The rootkit would be loaded in physical memory pages that are inaccessible to the running OS and can mediate device access to hide blocks on disk. This presentation will describe how VT-x can be used by rootkit authors, demonstrate a rootkit based on these techniques, and begin to explore how such rootkits may be detected. 	 	Dino Dai Zovi is a principal member of Matasano Security where he performs consulting engagements as well as research and development. Dino is a computer security professional and researcher with over 7 years of experience in software, web application, and network penetration testing, application and operating system source code review, cryptosystem design and review, malware analysis, security tool development, and Red Team security analysis for Fortune 100 firms and federal government departments and agencies. Dino's other research projects include KARMA, a wireless client-side security assessment toolkit, and Viha, the first monitor-mode wireless driver for Apple's AirPort 802.11b network cards."

Dino Dai Zovi: Hardware Virtualization Based Rootkits

"Hardware-supported CPU virtualization extensions such as Intel's VT-x allow multiple operating systems to be run at full speed and without modification simultaneously on the same processor. These extensions are already supported in shipping processors such as the Intel® Core Solo and Duo processors found in laptops released in early 2006 with availability in desktop and server processors following later in the year. While these extensions are very useful for multiple-OS computing, they also present useful capabilities to rootkit authors. On VT-capable hardware, an attacker may install a rootkit "hypervisor" that transparently runs the original operating system in a VM. The rootkit would be loaded in physical memory pages that are inaccessible to the running OS and can mediate device access to hide blocks on disk.  This presentation will describe how VT-x can be used by rootkit authors, demonstrate a rootkit based on these techniques, and begin to explore how such rootkits may be detected.		Dino Dai Zovi is a principal member of Matasano Security where he performs consulting engagements as well as research and development. Dino is a computer security professional and researcher with over 7 years of experience in software, web application, and network penetration testing, application and operating system source code review, cryptosystem design and review, malware analysis, security tool development, and Red Team security analysis for Fortune 100 firms and federal government departments and agencies. Dino's other research projects include KARMA, a wireless client-side security assessment toolkit, and Viha, the first monitor-mode wireless driver for Apple's AirPort 802.11b network cards."

"Hardware-supported CPU virtualization extensions such as Intel's VT-x allow multiple operating systems to be run at full speed and without modification simultaneously on the same processor. These extensions are already supported in shipping processors such as the Intel® Core Solo and Duo processors found in laptops released in early 2006 with availability in desktop and server processors following later in the year. While these extensions are very useful for multiple-OS computing, they also present useful capabilities to rootkit authors. On VT-capable hardware, an attacker may install a rootkit "hypervisor" that transparently runs the original operating system in a VM. The rootkit would be loaded in physical memory pages that are inaccessible to the running OS and can mediate device access to hide blocks on disk. This presentation will describe how VT-x can be used by rootkit authors, demonstrate a rootkit based on these techniques, and begin to explore how such rootkits may be detected. 	 	Dino Dai Zovi is a principal member of Matasano Security where he performs consulting engagements as well as research and development. Dino is a computer security professional and researcher with over 7 years of experience in software, web application, and network penetration testing, application and operating system source code review, cryptosystem design and review, malware analysis, security tool development, and Red Team security analysis for Fortune 100 firms and federal government departments and agencies. Dino's other research projects include KARMA, a wireless client-side security assessment toolkit, and Viha, the first monitor-mode wireless driver for Apple's AirPort 802.11b network cards."