Mahesh Tripunitara's guest appearances

Mahesh Tripunitara

CERIAS Weekly Security Seminar - Purdue University

Ryan Henry

Cory Doctorow

Doug Smith

Larry Ponemon

George Heron

Laura Thomas

Eli Lilly

Stephen Elliott

Tony Sager

David Carroll

Jack Daniel

Joe Judge

Chris Reed

Richard III

John Richardson

OwlTail

Wenliang Du

We will discuss a novel approach to building safeguards against denial of service attacks against communication protocols. Our approach involves changes to the relevant communication protocol subject to the following constraint: the protocol that results from the change must be backward compatible with the unchanged protocol. That is, an entity that employs the changed protocol must be able to communicate with an entity that employs the unchanged version.We will look at a specific problem in this context. The problem involves a class of denial of service attacks against IP. The class is called ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) cache poisoning and involves an attacker introducing a spurious IP to Ethernet mapping in a victim's ARP cache. We will discuss the solution and some implementation aspects of it. Apart from being backward compatible, our solution has two favourable properties: it is implemented as middleware, and is asynchronous. About the speaker: Mahesh Tripunitara is a PhD student of computer science at Purdue, a member of CERIAS and an advisee of Prof. Gene Spafford. At dawn, he commutes 85 miles to campus, during the day, he dreams of graduation, and during the night he snoozes at his desk. He performed part of this work during a 9-month exile at AT&amp;T Labs, 2500 miles away. Portions of this work will be presented at the upcoming Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC\'99).

We will discuss a novel approach to building safeguards against denial of service attacks against communication protocols. Our approach involves changes to the relevant communication protocol subject to the following constraint: the protocol that results from the change must be backward compatible with the unchanged protocol. That is, an entity that employs the changed protocol must be able to communicate with an entity that employs the unchanged version. We will look at a specific problem in this context. The problem involves a class of denial of service attacks against IP. The class is called ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) cache poisoning and involves an attacker introducing a spurious IP to Ethernet mapping in a victim's ARP cache. We will discuss the solution and some implementation aspects of it. Apart from being backward compatible, our solution has two favourable properties: it is implemented as middleware, and is asynchronous. About the speaker: Mahesh Tripunitara is a PhD student of computer science at Purdue, a member of CERIAS and an advisee of Prof. Gene Spafford. At dawn, he commutes 85 miles to campus, during the day, he dreams of graduation, and during the night he snoozes at his desk. He performed part of this work during a 9-month exile at AT&amp;T Labs, 2500 miles away. Portions of this work will be presented at the upcoming Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC\'99).

Mahesh Tripunitara, Thwarting Denial of Service Attacks against Communication Protocols with Backward Compatible Changes: A Case Study

We will discuss a novel approach to building safeguards againstdenial of service attacks against communication protocols. Ourapproach involves changes to the relevant communication protocolsubject to the following constraint: the protocol that results fromthe change must be backward compatible with the unchanged protocol.That is, an entity that employs the changed protocol must be ableto communicate with an entity that employs the unchanged version.We will look at a specific problem in this context. The probleminvolves a class of denial of service attacks against IP. The classis called ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) cache poisoning andinvolves an attacker introducing a spurious IP to Ethernet mappingin a victim's ARP cache. We will discuss the solution and someimplementation aspects of it. Apart from being backward compatible,our solution has two favourable properties: it is implemented asmiddleware, and is asynchronous.

We will discuss a novel approach to building safeguards against denial of service attacks against communication protocols. Our approach involves changes to the relevant communication protocol subject to the following constraint: the protocol that results from the change must be backward compatible with the unchanged protocol. That is, an entity that employs the changed protocol must be able to communicate with an entity that employs the unchanged version. We will look at a specific problem in this context. The problem involves a class of denial of service attacks against IP. The class is called ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) cache poisoning and involves an attacker introducing a spurious IP to Ethernet mapping in a victim's ARP cache. We will discuss the solution and some implementation aspects of it. Apart from being backward compatible, our solution has two favourable properties: it is implemented as middleware, and is asynchronous.

Mahesh Tripunitara, "Thwarting Denial of Service Attacks against Communication Protocols with Backward Compatible Changes: A Case Study"