Terence Cuneo's guest appearances

Terence Cuneo

New Books in Language

New Books in Philosophy

New Books Network

Back To Square Kwan

Kathryn Conrad

Steven Gimbel

Chad Engelland

Beata Stawarska

Karen Neander

Justin Tosi

Brandon Warmke

Ruth G. Millikan

Priyambada Sarkar

Palgrave Macmillan

K. Linder

Malcolm Keating

Alberto Cairo

Peter Ludlow

Jody Azzouni

OwlTail

'Are there any actions that are right or wrong?'Metaethics is the study of moral judgment's nature, scope, and meaning. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers. And as you know, our residential philosopher Kedric loves to spend his limited free time exploring the rabbit holes of philosophy. In today's episode, alongside Dr. Terence Cuneo, we look to explore the essence of morals. Through the lens of a philosopher, what does it mean to have moral concepts indeed, the nature of morality, and do we truly have one true morality? 

'Are there any actions that are right or wrong?'Metaethics is the study of moral judgment's nature, scope, and meaning. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers. And as you know, our residential philosopher Kedric loves to spend his limited free time exploring the rabbit holes of philosophy. In today's episode, alongside Dr. Terence Cuneo, we look to explore the essence of morals. Through the lens of a philosopher, what does it mean to have moral concepts indeed, the nature of morality, and do we truly have one true morality?

Philosophy on metaethics with Dr. Terence Cuneo

It is widely accepted that in uttering sentences we sometimes perform distinctive kinds of acts. We declare, assert, challenge, question, corroborate by means of speech; sometimes we also use speech to perform acts such as promising, commanding, judging, pronouncing, and christening. Yet it seems that in order to perform an act of, say, promising, one must have a certain kind of normative status; at the very least, one must be accountable. Similarly, in order to issue a command, one must, in some sense, have the authority to do so. It seems, then, that the power to perform acts by means of speech depends upon the normative status and standing of speakers.In Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking (Oxford University Press, 2014), Terence Cuneo appeals to this fact in devising an original and compelling argument for moral realism. He claims that were it not for the existence of moral facts, we would not be able to perform ordinary speech acts such as promising. As we clearly do perform such acts, there must be moral facts. That’s the simple argument that lies at the heart of Cuneo’s fascinating book. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/language

It is widely accepted that in uttering sentences we sometimes perform distinctive kinds of acts. We declare, assert, challenge, question, corroborate by means of speech; sometimes we also use speech to perform acts such as promising, commanding, judging, pronouncing, and christening. Yet it seems that in order to perform an act of, say, promising, one must have a certain kind of normative status; at the very least, one must be accountable. Similarly, in order to issue a command, one must, in some sense, have the authority to do so. It seems, then, that the power to perform acts by means of speech depends upon the normative status and standing of speakers. In <a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/0198712723/?tag=newbooinhis-20" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking</a> (Oxford University Press, 2014), <a href="https://www.uvm.edu/~phildept/?Page=Cuneo.php" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Terence Cuneo </a>appeals to this fact in devising an original and compelling argument for moral realism. He claims that were it not for the existence of moral facts, we would not be able to perform ordinary speech acts such as promising. As we clearly do perform such acts, there must be moral facts. That’s the simple argument that lies at the heart of Cuneo’s fascinating book. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit <a href="https://megaphone.fm/adchoices" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">megaphone.fm/adchoices</a>Support our show by becoming a premium member! <a href="https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/language" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/language</a>

Terence Cuneo, “Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking” (Oxford,

It is widely accepted that in uttering sentences we sometimes perform distinctive kinds of acts. We declare, assert, challenge, question, corroborate by means of speech; sometimes we also use speech to perform acts such as promising, commanding, judging, pronouncing, and christening. Yet it seems that in order to perform an act of, say, promising, one must have a certain kind of normative status; at the very least, one must be accountable. Similarly, in order to issue a command, one must, in some sense, have the authority to do so. It seems, then, that the power to perform acts by means of speech depends upon the normative status and standing of speakers.In Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking (Oxford University Press, 2014), Terence Cuneo appeals to this fact in devising an original and compelling argument for moral realism. He claims that were it not for the existence of moral facts, we would not be able to perform ordinary speech acts such as promising. As we clearly do perform such acts, there must be moral facts. That’s the simple argument that lies at the heart of Cuneo’s fascinating book. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy

It is widely accepted that in uttering sentences we sometimes perform distinctive kinds of acts. We declare, assert, challenge, question, corroborate by means of speech; sometimes we also use speech to perform acts such as promising, commanding, judging, pronouncing, and christening. Yet it seems that in order to perform an act of, say, promising, one must have a certain kind of normative status; at the very least, one must be accountable. Similarly, in order to issue a command, one must, in some sense, have the authority to do so. It seems, then, that the power to perform acts by means of speech depends upon the normative status and standing of speakers. In <a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/0198712723/?tag=newbooinhis-20" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking</a> (Oxford University Press, 2014), <a href="https://www.uvm.edu/~phildept/?Page=Cuneo.php" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Terence Cuneo </a>appeals to this fact in devising an original and compelling argument for moral realism. He claims that were it not for the existence of moral facts, we would not be able to perform ordinary speech acts such as promising. As we clearly do perform such acts, there must be moral facts. That’s the simple argument that lies at the heart of Cuneo’s fascinating book. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit <a href="https://megaphone.fm/adchoices" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">megaphone.fm/adchoices</a>Support our show by becoming a premium member! <a href="https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy</a>