Uriah Kriegel's guest appearances

Uriah Kriegel

New Books in Psychology

New Books in Philosophy

New Books Network

The Consciousness Podcast

Houston Ensemble

In Conversation: An OUP Podcast

Berit Brogaard

Elizabeth Schechter

Jennifer Greenwood

Susanna Schellenberg

Susan Schneider

Cressida J. Heyes

Bongrae Seok

John Campbell

Myisha Cherry

Kathryn Conrad

Alberto Cairo

Catarina Dutilh Novaes

Nicholas Shea

Michael Cholbi

Quassim Cassam

OwlTail

This week, I had the honor of speaking with Dr. Uriah Kriegel. Dr. Kriegel is a research director at the Jean Nicod Institute in Paris, where he heads the “Consciousness &amp; Self” team. He works mostly in philosophy of mind and metaphysics, but is also interested in cognitive science, metaethics, epistemology, early analytic philosophy, and a number of other research areas. He received his PhD from Brown University in 2003, whereupon he started teaching at the wonderful philosophy department at the University of Arizona, where he was tenured in 2010. He moved to Nicod in 2012.  It was a fascinating conversation, where we touched on topics from the Awareness Principle to eating one’s brain to learn what chocolate tastes like (hint: you can’t do that) to Arizona’s connection with Asthma to being ‘nobody’s dog!’   Go buy Uriah’s books on Amazon: Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory The Varieties of Consciousness (Philosophy of Mind) The Sources of Intentionality And many more! Some topics covered:  Manifest image of the world versus the scientific image of the world One can’t eat your brain as you eat chocolate and know what chocolate tastes like Does consciousness fit into the scientific world? The Awareness Principle: can we be wrong about our awareness of our awareness? The Scientific Theory of Everything and Reflexive Awareness Are dreams an exception to the Awareness Principle? Memories aren’t an essential part of consciousness. Meditation, dreaming and allocating your awareness resources Is all consciousness intentional? What the heck does that mean, anyway? The near-perfect correlation between the physical brain and consciousness Does Arizona cause Asthma?  Morality, Consciousness and Free Will offer similar challenges — will the Humanities help us find our reason for being, our purpose in life? Undiscovered building blocks of consciousness  The post Episode 1: Uriah Kriegel appeared first on The Consciousness Podcast.

This week, I had the honor of speaking with Dr. Uriah Kriegel. Dr. Kriegel is a research director at the Jean Nicod Institute in Paris, where he heads the “Consciousness &amp; Self” team. He works mostly in philosophy of mind and metaphysics, but is also interested in cognitive science, metaethics, epistemology, early analytic philosophy, and a number of other research areas. He received his PhD from Brown University in 2003, whereupon he started teaching at the wonderful philosophy department at the University of Arizona, where he was tenured in 2010. He moved to Nicod in 2012. It was a fascinating conversation, where we touched on topics from the Awareness Principle to eating one’s brain to learn what chocolate tastes like (hint: you can’t do that) to Arizona’s connection with Asthma to being ‘nobody’s dog!’   Go buy <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Uriah-Kriegel/e/B001HCY3JY/ref=sr_ntt_srch_lnk_3?qid=1500944223&amp;sr=8-3" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Uriah’s books on Amazon</a>: Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory The Varieties of Consciousness (Philosophy of Mind) The Sources of Intentionality And many more! Some topics covered: <ul> <li>Manifest image of the world versus the scientific image of the world</li> <li>One can’t eat your brain as you eat chocolate and know what chocolate tastes like</li> <li>Does consciousness fit into the scientific world?</li> <li>The Awareness Principle: can we be wrong about our awareness of our awareness?</li> <li>The Scientific Theory of Everything and Reflexive Awareness</li> <li>Are dreams an exception to the Awareness Principle?</li> <li>Memories aren’t an essential part of consciousness.</li> <li>Meditation, dreaming and allocating your awareness resources</li> <li>Is all consciousness intentional? What the heck does that mean, anyway?</li> <li>The near-perfect correlation between the physical brain and consciousness</li> <li>Does Arizona cause Asthma? </li> <li>Morality, Consciousness and Free Will offer similar challenges — will the Humanities help us find our reason for being, our purpose in life?</li> <li>Undiscovered building blocks of consciousness</li> </ul> The post <a href="https://theconsciousnesspodcast.com/episode-1-uriah-kriegel/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Episode 1: Uriah Kriegel</a> appeared first on <a href="https://theconsciousnesspodcast.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">The Consciousness Podcast</a>.

Episode 1: Uriah Kriegel

It’s standard in philosophy of mind to distinguish between two basic kinds of mental phenomena: intentional states, which are about or represent other items or themselves, such as beliefs about your mother’s new hairdo, and phenomenal states, such as feelings of pain or visual experiences of seeing red. It’s also hotly debated how to explain how both kinds of mental phenomena are part of a purely physical world. The dominant approach in recent decades is to explain the phenomenal in terms of the intentional and the intentional in terms of the physical causal – that is, to explain conscious experience in terms of intentionality and to explain intentionality in terms of causal relations between thinkers and what they are thinking about.In his new book, The Sources of Intentionality (Oxford University Press), Uriah Kriegel, associate professor of philosophy at the University of Arizona, argues for a reversal of this order of explanation. On his view, conscious experience is basic to the explanation of all mental phenomena. In this erudite, stylish and provocative volume, Kriegel weighs the relative virtues of higher-order tracking and adverbial theories of experiential intentionality, and defends an interpretivist account of non-experiential intentionality. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy

It’s standard in philosophy of mind to distinguish between two basic kinds of mental phenomena: intentional states, which are about or represent other items or themselves, such as beliefs about your mother’s new hairdo, and phenomenal states, such as feelings of pain or visual experiences of seeing red. It’s also hotly debated how to explain how both kinds of mental phenomena are part of a purely physical world. The dominant approach in recent decades is to explain the phenomenal in terms of the intentional and the intentional in terms of the physical causal – that is, to explain conscious experience in terms of intentionality and to explain intentionality in terms of causal relations between thinkers and what they are thinking about. In his new book, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/0199742979/?tag=newbooinhis-20" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">The Sources of Intentionality</a> (Oxford University Press), <a href="http://uriahkriegel.com/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Uriah Kriegel</a>, associate professor of philosophy at the University of Arizona, argues for a reversal of this order of explanation. On his view, conscious experience is basic to the explanation of all mental phenomena. In this erudite, stylish and provocative volume, Kriegel weighs the relative virtues of higher-order tracking and adverbial theories of experiential intentionality, and defends an interpretivist account of non-experiential intentionality. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit <a href="https://megaphone.fm/adchoices" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">megaphone.fm/adchoices</a>Support our show by becoming a premium member! <a href="https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy</a>

Uriah Kriegel, “The Sources of Intentionality” (Oxford UP, 2011)

It’s standard in philosophy of mind to distinguish between two basic kinds of mental phenomena: intentional states, which are about or represent other items or themselves, such as beliefs about your mother’s new hairdo, and phenomenal states, such as feelings of pain or visual experiences of seeing red. It’s also hotly debated how to explain how both kinds of mental phenomena are part of a purely physical world. The dominant approach in recent decades is to explain the phenomenal in terms of the intentional and the intentional in terms of the physical causal – that is, to explain conscious experience in terms of intentionality and to explain intentionality in terms of causal relations between thinkers and what they are thinking about.In his new book, The Sources of Intentionality (Oxford University Press), Uriah Kriegel, associate professor of philosophy at the University of Arizona, argues for a reversal of this order of explanation. On his view, conscious experience is basic to the explanation of all mental phenomena. In this erudite, stylish and provocative volume, Kriegel weighs the relative virtues of higher-order tracking and adverbial theories of experiential intentionality, and defends an interpretivist account of non-experiential intentionality. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/psychology

It’s standard in philosophy of mind to distinguish between two basic kinds of mental phenomena: intentional states, which are about or represent other items or themselves, such as beliefs about your mother’s new hairdo, and phenomenal states, such as feelings of pain or visual experiences of seeing red. It’s also hotly debated how to explain how both kinds of mental phenomena are part of a purely physical world. The dominant approach in recent decades is to explain the phenomenal in terms of the intentional and the intentional in terms of the physical causal – that is, to explain conscious experience in terms of intentionality and to explain intentionality in terms of causal relations between thinkers and what they are thinking about. In his new book, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/0199742979/?tag=newbooinhis-20" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">The Sources of Intentionality</a> (Oxford University Press), <a href="http://uriahkriegel.com/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Uriah Kriegel</a>, associate professor of philosophy at the University of Arizona, argues for a reversal of this order of explanation. On his view, conscious experience is basic to the explanation of all mental phenomena. In this erudite, stylish and provocative volume, Kriegel weighs the relative virtues of higher-order tracking and adverbial theories of experiential intentionality, and defends an interpretivist account of non-experiential intentionality. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit <a href="https://megaphone.fm/adchoices" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">megaphone.fm/adchoices</a>Support our show by becoming a premium member! <a href="https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/psychology" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/psychology</a>