Amanda Askell's guest appearances

Amanda Askell

Rationally Speaking Podcast

EARadio

80,000 Hours Podcast

EA Talks

Marc Lipsitch

Peter Singer

Toby Ord

Holden Karnofsky

Kelsey Piper

Rob Wiblin

Robin Hanson

Helen Toner

Benjamin Todd

Ezra Klein

Max Tegmark

Anders Sandberg

Spencer Greenberg

Ed Boyden

Cass Sunstein

OwlTail

Consider two familiar moments at a family reunion. Our host, Uncle Bill, takes pride in his barbecuing skills. But his niece Becky says that she now refuses to eat meat. A groan goes round the table; the family mostly think of this as an annoying picky preference. But if seriously considered as a moral position, as they might if instead Becky were avoiding meat on religious grounds, it would usually receive a very different reaction. An hour later Bill expresses a strong objection to abortion. Again, a groan goes round the table; the family mostly think that he has no business in trying to foist his regressive preference on anyone. But if considered not as a matter of personal taste, but rather as a moral position - that Bill genuinely believes he’s opposing mass-murder - his comment might start a serious conversation. Amanda Askell, who recently completed a PhD in philosophy at NYU focused on the ethics of infinity, thinks that we often betray a complete lack of moral empathy. All sides of the political spectrum struggle to get inside the mind of people we disagree with and see issues from their point of view. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. This often happens because of confusion between preferences and moral positions. Assuming good faith on the part of the person you disagree with, and actually engaging with the beliefs they claim to hold, is perhaps the best remedy for our inability to make progress on controversial issues.  One potential path for progress surrounds contraception; a lot of people who are anti-abortion are also anti-contraception. But they’ll usually think that abortion is much worse than contraception, so why can’t we compromise and agree to have much more contraception available? According to Amanda, a charitable explanation for this is that people who are anti-abortion and anti-contraception engage in moral reasoning and advocacy based on what, in their minds, is the best of all possible worlds: one where people neither use contraception nor get abortions. So instead of arguing about abortion and contraception, we could discuss the underlying principle that one should advocate for the best possible world, rather than the best probable world. Successfully break down such ethical beliefs, absent political toxicity, and it might be possible to actually converge on a key point of agreement. Today’s episode blends such everyday topics with in-depth philosophy, including: * What is 'moral cluelessness' and how can we work around it? * Amanda's biggest criticisms of social justice activists, and of critics of social justice activists * Is there an ethical difference between prison and corporal punishment? * How to resolve 'infinitarian paralysis' - the inability to make decisions when infinities are involved. * What’s effective altruism doing wrong? * How should we think about jargon? Are a lot of people who don’t communicate clearly just scamming us? * How can people be more successful within the cocoon of school and university? * How did Amanda find doing a philosophy PhD, and how will she decide what to do now? Links: * Career review: Congressional staffer * Randomised experiment on quitting * Psychology replication quiz * Should you focus on your comparative advantage. Get this episode by subscribing: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. The 80,000 Hours podcast is produced by Keiran Harris.

Consider two familiar moments at a family reunion. Our host, Uncle Bill, takes pride in his barbecuing skills. But his niece Becky says that she now refuses to eat meat. A groan goes round the table; the family mostly think of this as an annoying picky preference. But if seriously considered as a moral position, as they might if instead Becky were avoiding meat on religious grounds, it would usually receive a very different reaction. An hour later Bill expresses a strong objection to abortion. Again, a groan goes round the table; the family mostly think that he has no business in trying to foist his regressive preference on anyone. But if considered not as a matter of personal taste, but rather as a moral position - that Bill genuinely believes he’s opposing mass-murder - his comment might start a serious conversation. Amanda Askell, who recently completed a PhD in philosophy at NYU focused on the ethics of infinity, thinks that we often betray a complete lack of moral empathy. All sides of the political spectrum struggle to get inside the mind of people we disagree with and see issues from their point of view. <a href="https://80k.link/amanda" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Links to learn more, summary and full transcript.</a> This often happens because of confusion between preferences and moral positions. Assuming good faith on the part of the person you disagree with, and actually engaging with the beliefs they claim to hold, is perhaps the best remedy for our inability to make progress on controversial issues. One potential path for progress surrounds contraception; a lot of people who are anti-abortion are also anti-contraception. But they’ll usually think that abortion is much worse than contraception, so why can’t we compromise and agree to have much more contraception available? <a href="http://www.rationalreflection.net/vegetarianism-abortion-and-moral-empathy/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">According to Amanda</a>, a charitable explanation for this is that people who are anti-abortion and anti-contraception engage in moral reasoning and advocacy based on what, in their minds, is the best of all possible worlds: one where people neither use contraception nor get abortions. So instead of arguing about abortion and contraception, we could discuss the underlying principle that one should advocate for the best possible world, rather than the best probable world. Successfully break down such ethical beliefs, absent political toxicity, and it might be possible to actually converge on a key point of agreement. Today’s episode blends such everyday topics with in-depth philosophy, including: * What is 'moral cluelessness' and how can we work around it? * Amanda's biggest criticisms of social justice activists, and of critics of social justice activists * Is there an ethical difference between prison and corporal punishment? * How to resolve 'infinitarian paralysis' - the inability to make decisions when infinities are involved. * What’s effective altruism doing wrong? * How should we think about jargon? Are a lot of people who don’t communicate clearly just scamming us? * How can people be more successful within the cocoon of school and university? * How did Amanda find doing a philosophy PhD, and how will she decide what to do now? Links: <a href="https://80k.link/congressional-staffer-amanda" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">* Career review: Congressional staffer</a> <a href="https://80k.link/quitting" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">* Randomised experiment on quitting</a> <a href="https://80k.link/psychology-replication-quiz-amanda" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">* Psychology replication quiz</a> <a href="https://80k.link/comparative-advantage-amanda" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">* Should you focus on your comparative advantage.</a> Get this episode by subscribing: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. The 80,000 Hours podcast is produced by Keiran Harris.

#42 - Amanda Askell on moral empathy, the value of information & the ethics of infinity

You've probably heard of Pascal's Wager: That it's rational to believe in God, because if you're wrong it's no big deal, but if you're right then the payoff is huge. This episode features philosopher Amanda Askell, who (though not religious herself) argues that it's much trickier to rebut Pascal's Wager than most people think. Amanda and Julia also discuss how to handle other decisions where a risk has very low probability but would matter a lot if it came true -- should you round them down to zero? Does it matter how measurable the risk is? And should you take into account the chance you're being scammed?

Rationally Speaking #190 - Amanda Askell on "Pascal's Wager and other low risks with high stakes"